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INTRODUCTION

In 1969 the Ohio legislature enacted Chapter 5313 of the Ohio
Revised Code, "Installment Land Contracts" (the "Act"). 1 The Act
has had a profound effect on all Ohio land contract law despite its being expressly limited to real property "improved by virtue of a dwelling
having been erected" thereon.2 Ohio courts have applied the Act for
twenty years, a period interrupted by a single legislative revision of the
Act in 1980. 3 Despite this apparent continuity in the law, the cases are
inconsistent in their application and interpretation of the Act.
In 1983 I published an article entitled "Forfeiture of Residential
Land Contracts in Ohio: The Need for Further Reform of a Reform
Statute" in the Akron Law Review.4 That article primarily was concerned with the effect of Ohio's installment land contract legislation on
low to moderate income persons who are the vendees of land contracts
for their personal residences. In that article I made several proposals
for legislative reform and judicial interpretation of the Act. While I
had hoped that my proposals would spur legislative action, they did
not. On the other hand, the 1983 article has been cited in Ohio cases
and research resources, 5 and in nationally oriented publications.6 None-

1. 1969 Ohio Laws 424, 424-30 (effective Nov. 25, 1969).
2. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(B) (Anderson 1989).
3. In addition to several minor changes, the legislature removed the Act's original limitation
to land contracts on which the principal amount was less than $30,000. For the current version of
the statute, see id.
4. Durham, Forfeiture of Residential Land Contracts in Ohio: The Need for Further Reform of a Reform Statute, 16 AKRON L. REV. 397 (1983).
5. Young v. Hodapp, No. 85-08-094 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 29, 1986)(LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file); Akron First Seventh Day Adventist Church v. Smith, No. 11577 (Ohio
Ct. App., 9th Dist. Sept. 27, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
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theless, because the 1983 article was directed toward legislative reform,
it apparently has been of little assistance to practitioners who must deal
with problems both with the Act and with the way it is being applied
by the courts. The purpose of this article is to address land contract
problems regularly faced by practicing lawyers both in litigation and in
advising clients in real estate transactions.
This article first will address briefly subjects which are.discussed
at length in the 1983 article, including pre-Act land contract law,7 the
basic provisions of the Act, 8 and problems in applying the Act to residential land contracts. 9 This article then will discuss, by referring to
decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court and to both published and unpublished decisions of the Ohio courts of appeals,"0 several problems which
are currently of concern to practitioners and their clients both as to
land contracts covered by the Act and land contracts not covered by
the Act.
II.

THE 1983 ARTICLE

The 1983 article utilized the Act's definition of land contract,
which also is a good statement of the common law definition of a land
contract:
"Land installment contract" means an executory agreement which by its
terms is not required to be fully performed by one or more of the parties
to the agreement within one year of the date of the agreement and under

which the vendor agrees to convey title in real property located in this
state to the vendee and the vendee agrees to pay the purchase price in
installment payments, while the vendor retains title to the property as
security for the vendee's obligation. Option contracts for the purchase of
real property are not land installment contracts."

5313.02, 5313.06, 5313.08 (Anderson 1989).
6. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 300, 309
(1987) [hereinafter NELSON, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER]; NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 3.28, at 91 (1985) [hereinafter NELSON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE]; PENNEY,
BROUDE & CUNNINGHAM. LAND FINANCING 553 (1985) [hereinafter PENNEY].
7. See infra text accompanying notes 14-38.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 40-61.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 62-76.
10. The discussion of current problems will be enhanced by a change in the way in which
legal research can be done; prior to 1981, most Ohio court of appeals cases were unpublished and
a particular decision could not be researched unless the researcher knew of the decision. See
Black, Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (1981);
Black, Unveiling Ohio's Hidden Court, 16 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1982). Since 1981, however,
Mead Data Central's Lexis service has indexed and published the officially unpublished opinions
of the Ohio courts of appeals. For example, the first unpublished case shown on Lexis in response
to the search request "land contract or land installment contract and forfeit! or foreclos!" is
Harpest v. Wilson (Ohio Ct. App., Feb. 23, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
II.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(A) (Anderson 1989).
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The Act's definition includes all of the common law aspects of the land
contract-title is retained by the vendor; the vendee makes installment
payments over a period of time leading to full payment of the purchase
price; and, after full payment of the purchase price, the vendor conveys
title to the vendee.
The 1983 article covers a broad range of topics, including discussions of the economic incentives for using land contracts 2 and the frequency of use of land contracts.' 3 The following section does not replicate the earlier article, but briefly summarizes the sections of the
article important to a discussion of current Ohio land contract law.
A.

Common Law

While the 1983 article explored at some length why courts began
permitting the forfeiture of land contracts, there are a few points that
can be briefly stated. First, forfeiture of land contracts is a relatively
new phenomenon which can be traced to 19th century American
courts. 4 Although a contractual provision for forfeiture is contrary to
equitable concepts and is embodied in the long-stated maxim "equity
abhors a forfeiture," the courts began permitting forfeiture in the heyday of the freedom of contract movement. If a contract included a
statement that "time is of the essence" and forfeiture was the stated
remedy, courts which supported freedom of contract often chose to allow forfeiture. 5
The modern trend among the states, however, has been to scrutinize forfeiture cases closely. The courts' reluctance to allow forfeiture
is perhaps best summed up in the statement by Professors Nelson and
Whitman that in evaluating current law forfeiture "at best serves as a
point of departure."'"
The states can be divided into three categories based on their treatment
of forfeiture: 1. statutory forfeiture with clear requirements for notice
and a period for reinstatement by the vendee; 2. statutory abolition of
forfeiture, either express or judicially implied, and treatment of land
contracts as mortgages; and 3. equitable judicial action allowing the
remedies of reinstatement, vendee's recovery of damages, vendee's redemption, or requiring foreclosure as if a mortgage in appropriate
7
cases.

12. Durham, supra note 4, at 400-04.
13. Id. at 404-09.
14. Id. at 409-11.
15. Id.
16. Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REv. 541, 543 (1977).
17. Durham, supra note 4, at 412.
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The ultimate point is that forfeiture is now a remedy disfavored by
both legislatures and courts. Together, and apart, the state legislatures
and the state courts have sought to restrict the use of forfeiture."i
B.

Ohio Common Law Before Enactment of the Act

Prior to enactment of Chapter 5313 of the Ohio Revised Code,
Ohio land contract law looked a great deal like that of other states.19
Forfeiture usually was granted only when the vendee had few equities
in her favor. In two 1836 cases, Rummington v. Kelley 0 and Scott v.
Fields,2 1 the Ohio Supreme Court granted forfeiture, but both vendees
were in significant default. 2 In both cases the vendees brought suit for
specific performance after the contract dates requiring full payment
had passed, and after the vendors had declared forfeitures; the vendees'
only equity was to offer to pay the balance due on the land contract.2"
As the Rummington court pointed out, the vendee never complied with
the contract, the vendor gave prompt notice of forfeiture, the land was
unimproved, and any improvements by the vendee were made after the
vendor declared forfeiture.2 4
From this beginning, two early Ohio court of appeals cases added
further doubt about the general availability to vendors of the forfeiture
remedy. In a 1919 case, Curtis v. Factory Site Co.,25 the court of appeals found that the vendor waived forfeiture by accepting late payments. In a 1922 case, Woloveck v. Schueler,6 the court of appeals
held that forfeiture would be "unjust, harsh and oppressive" because a
third party's "substantial interest in the property" deprived the vendor
of good title.2 7 The Woloveck court, however, allowed the vendor to
foreclose on the vendee's interest, stating, "[w]hile it cannot be said
that the weight of authority sustains this proposition, we believe it to be

18. There is an extensive discussion in the 1983 article of the responses to forfeiture by
many states. Id. at 412-19.
19. Id. at 420-25.
20. 7 Ohio 97 (1836).
21. 7 Ohio 91 (1836).
22. In Rummington, the vendee made none of the four annual installments called for in the
contract. Rummington, 7 Ohio at 98. In Scott, the vendee made the first two of four quarterly
payments required by the contract but did not offer to make the third payment until 45 days after
it was due. Scott, 7 Ohio at 92. The vendor refused the third payment, having already sold the
land, and the vendee waited until the due date for the fourth payment before again offering payment. Id. at 92.
23. Id. at 95; Rummington, 7 Ohio at 98-99.
24. Rummington, 7 Ohio at 103-04.
25. 12 Ohio App. 148 (1919).
26. 19 Ohio App. 210 (1922).
27. Id. at 220.
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equitable and sound." 2 8
Shortly after Woloveck, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Norpac Realty Co. v. Schackne,2 9 allowed forfeiture against a vendee who had not
made any principal payments after making the initial $12,500 downpayment on the $50,000 purchase price. 30 The court, nonetheless,
stated that forfeiture is not always appropriate:
Cases may arise where equity might intervene, as where the agreed or
stipulated damages are used as a guise to cover what would otherwise be
a penalty, and the amount agreed upon so unconscionably large that a
court of equity would not enforce it. This is not such a case. 1
The court also rejected the vendee's request for foreclosure, stating that
"[t]his was not the contract nor the intention expressed therein. '32
The most important aspect of the Norpac decision is the fact that
the vendee had paid 25 % of the principal.33 The court stated that the
amount was "large, considered in proportion to the agreed price, but it
was not so disproportionate, so extravagantly unreasonable, or so manifestly unjust as to require equitable interference with the contract
agreed to." ' One commentator has called this the Norpac "qualification test,"38 and courts of appeals have cited Norpac for this vague
formulation. 6 Nonetheless, since Norpac most courts of appeals have
denied forfeiture when faced with the choice of upholding an order for
forfeiture or overturning it."T The section of the 1983 article on Ohio
common law concluded by stating:
[I]t appears that Ohio's land contract case law is fairly progressive. Forfeiture appears to be appropriate only upon a showing that the vendee
has paid little or nothing, has little excuse for not paying, or is unwilling
or unable to pay and that the vendor has faithfully complied with the
contract and consistently insisted that the vendee comply with the
contract. 8
Since the Act came into effect, however, forfeiture has been granted in
several Ohio cases. These cases will be discussed in a later section of

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
(1962).
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 224.
107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923).
Id. at 430, 140 N.E. at 481-82.
Id. at 429, 140 N.E. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 425, 140 N.E. at 480.
Id. at 430, 140 N.E. at 481.
Note, Land Contracts in Ohio-The Need for Reform, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 554, 561
See Durham, supra note 4, at 422-25.
Id.
Id. at 424 (footnotes omitted).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss3/2

1989]

this article.3
C.

OHIO LAND CONTRACTS REVISITED
9

The Act: Statutory "Reform"

One commentator concluded that it was a "consumer oriented"
legislature "passing laws to protect those who do not have enough bargaining power to protect themselves"4 which passed the installment
land contract act. This conclusion was at one time particularly accurate
because the Act originally was limited to land contracts with purchase
prices of less than $30,000.1 Now that the $30,000 limitation has been
removed, the Act has had a substantial impact on the remedies available to vendors and vendees whose land contracts are covered by the
Act, and on the courts in considering cases involving land contracts not
covered by the Act.
1. Notices
The Act requires that the vendee must be in default for at least
thirty days before the vendor may take action against the vendee."2 The
vendor must then give a notice to the vendee which is specific enough
to inform the vendee what default is being claimed by the vendor and
which gives the vendee ten days to perform "the terms and conditions
of the contract. '4 3 During the thirty day period the vendee may reinstate the contract by paying all past due payments and performing any
other obligations required of him under the contract.4 4 The 1983 article
asserted that the vendee could reinstate during the ten day period,"
but in a subsequent case," which will be discussed in a later section of

See infra text accompanying notes 189-235.
Smith, Land Installment Contracts (An Analysis of the 1969 Act), OHIO ST. B. Assoc.
SERV. LETTER I (Dec. 1969).
41. See Durham, supra note 4, at 425; supra note 3.
42. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.05-07 (Anderson 1989). Section 5313.05 allows a declaration of forfeiture "only after the expiration of thirty days from the date of the default." Section
5313.06 then requires the vendor to give the vendee notice of a declaration of forfeiture and
subsection (C) requires that the notice inform "the vendee that the contract will stand forfeited
unless the vendee performs the terms and conditions of the contract within ten days." Finally,
section 5313.07 requires foreclosure in some cases and provides that "[sluch action may be commenced after the expiration of the period of time prescribed by sections 5313.05 and 5313.06 of
the Revised Code."
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.06 (Anderson 1989); see also supra note 42.
44. Durham, supra note 4, at 426. By stating that "the vendee may reinstate the contract" I
mean that by paying all past due and due payments, and performing any other acts required by
the contract, the vendee may continue to make periodic payments under the terms of the contract.
The vendee therefore will avoid any attempt by the vendor to declare that the due date for the
balance of the contract is accelerated or that vendee's interest is forfeited.
45. Id. at 426-27.
46. Keene v. Schnetz, 13 Ohio App. 3d 87, 468 N.E.2d 125 (1983).
39.
40.
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this article,"7 an Ohio court of appeals held that the vendee's only option during the ten day period is to pay the balance due on the contract, rather than to pay past due installments and reinstate the
contract."8
2.

Forfeiture and Foreclosure

The Act confirms two traditional remedies available to a vendorforfeiture and foreclosure. 50 If the vendee has paid more than twenty
percent of the purchase price on the land contract, or "has paid in accordance with the terms of the contract for a period of five years or
more from the date of the first payment," then the vendor may not
declare a forfeiture but must instead foreclose.5" In any other situation
the vendor may declare a forfeiture. 5 Several cases have interpreted
these provisions and will be discussed in subsequent sections. 53
Section 5313.08 of the Ohio Revised Code, which sanctions forfeiture, makes reference to Chapter 1923 of the Ohio Revised Code,
"Forcible Entry and Detainer. ' ' 54 Section 1923.02(A)(7) of the Ohio
Revised Code authorizes trial courts in forcible detainer actions "to declare a forfeiture of the vendee's rights under a land installment contract." 55 The 1983 article suggested the possibility that when sections
5313.08 and 1923.02 are read along with O.R.C. section 1923.09,56
judges either would feel compelled to grant forfeiture in all cases meeting the statutory requirements or would give a strong presumption in
favor of granting forfeiture. 5 The effect of these statutes will be discussed in a later section of this article. 58
3. Other Remedies
Beyond forfeiture and foreclosure, the 1983 article asserted that
section 5313.07 of the Ohio Revised Code also extended other remedies
to a land contract vendor:
First, the vendor may bring an action to interpret the contract, if

47.
48.
49.
50.

See infra text accompanying notes 206-16.
Keene, 13 Ohio App. 3d 87, 468 N.E.2d 125.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.08; Durham, supra note 4, at 427-29.
OMlO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07; see Durham, supra note 4, at 427-29.
51. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07.
52. Id. § 5313.08.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 135-188.
54. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1923.01-15 (Anderson 1989).
55. Id. § 1923.02(A)(7).
56. Id. § 1923.09 (which states that if a judge "finds the complaint true, he shall render a
general judgment against the defendant").
57. Durham, supra note 4, at 427-28.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 189-235.
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there is any dispute over the interests created and retained under the
contract, by bringing a quiet title action. Second, the vendor may bring
an action for the past due installments. It appears to be possible also to
use the statute's language as the basis for a suit for specific performance
by the vendee if the land contract contains an acceleration clause and
the vendor has declared the contract to be accelerated.
Third, the vendor would be able to seek damages, during or after a
foreclosure action, or, for that matter, a forfeiture action, under. section
5313.10. . .
.

O.R.C. section 5313.10 bars all damage actions except one by the vendor against the vendee when the vendee has paid less than the fair
rental value of the premises "plus deterioration or destruction of the
property occasioned by the vendee's use." 0 The vendor then may sue
for the difference between the amount paid and the aggregate of the
fair rental value and the cost of any deterioration or destruction. Statutory damages will be discussed in a later section of this article. 1
4.

Proposed Legislative and Judicial Reform

The 1983 article proposed several legislative reforms to the Act 6 2
and several judicial interpretations 63 which could give new meaning to
the Act. These proposals were based on the premise, which the 1983
article established through the use of data about land contracts 4 and a
lengthy discussion about the data and current Ohio law, 6" that there
was still some use for the forfeiture remedy. 66
The 1983 article recommended 67 removing the limitation on forfeiture actions to those contracts in effect for less than five years 8 because the length of time a land contract is in effect may not be determinative of whether the vendee has a significant interest in the
property. The property could, on one hand, rapidly increase in value or,
on the other hand, slowly decrease in value. 9 Further, because the
20% requirement seemed too high, 70 the 1983 article recommended
that the percentage be reduced to a 5 % "true equity" in the property,

59.

Durham, supra note 4, at 429 (footnotes omitted).

60. Omo
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 5313.10.

See infra text accompanying notes 236-83.
See Durham, supra note 4, at 434-38.
See id. at 438-40.
Id. at 441-46.
Id. at 399-409.
Id. at 431-33.
Id. at 434-38.
Id. at 435.
Id.
Id. at 435-36.
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i.e., actual market value as of the date the vendor declares forfeiture. 7
In addition, the 1983 article recommended that the courts be given specific authorization to require foreclosure in any action brought by a
vendor against her vendee when the court determines, given the facts of
the case, that foreclosure is the more equitable remedy. 2
The 1983 article also urged the courts to take a lenient approach
toward vendees in forfeiture actions.7" That article urged judges to use
their inherent equitable powers in refusing to grant forfeiture unless
they are convinced that forfeiture is an equitable remedy in that particular case.7' The 1983 article also urged courts to find waiver in any
case where the vendor accepts late payments or allows the vendee to
miss payments.7 5 Finally, and most importantly, the 1983 article urged
the courts to find that a vendee could redeem, up to the date of the
final judgment, by paying the total amount due under the land
contract.7 6
III.

LAND CONTRACT CASES IN WHICH THE ACT IS CONSIDERED

The purpose of this section is to review and analyze three different
types of cases: those which have applied the Act; 77 those which have
refused to apply the Act; and, those which have used the Act by analogy in reaching decisions in cases to which the Act did not apply.
There have been many land contract cases since the Act was passed,
and many more now can be researched. What follows primarily is a
review of Ohio law as it is being fashioned by the courts of appeals in
unreported cases. Any published court of appeals opinion which is discussed is clearly indicated as such.
A.

Cases Determining Whether to Apply the Act

Some Ohio courts of appeals have experienced difficulty in determining whether the Act should apply in certain cases. The following
subsections detail cases in which the courts have been confronted with
the question of whether the Act should apply and in which courts have

71. Id.
72. Id. at 437.
73. Id. at 438-40.
74. Id. at 439.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 439-440.
77. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01-.10 (Anderson 1989).
78. See supra note 10. For example, as of June 1, 1989, Lexis produced 172 cases in response to the search request "land contract or land installment contract and forfeit! or foreclos!
and date after 1/1/80." The first unpublished court of appeals opinion is dated February 23,
1981. Id. Of the 172 cases, only nine are published opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court. Further,
of the 163 court of appeals cases only eighteen were published with the remaining 145 cases being
unpublished slip opinions.
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assumed the Act is applicable, even though the facts of the case do not
warrant the assumption.
1. Retroactivity of O.R.C. Section 5313
The Act does not address the issue of whether it is applicable to
land contracts entered into before the effective date of the Act. The
issue is significant because the Act prohibits forfeiture if the land contract has been in effect for more than five years or if more than 20 % of
79
the purchase price has been paid.
Two Ohio courts of appeals have reached the same result, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth District in Vukin v. Gerena,80 and the
Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District in Kiser v. Coleman."1 In
Vukin, the parties entered into the land contract on February 24, 1969;
the Act did not become effective until November 25, 1969.82 The vendor's assignee filed her foreclosure action on August 10, 1981.83 The
Vukin court unanimously held that because the Act was "remedial in
nature it may be applied retrospectively and should have been so applied in this case.''4
In Kiser, the parties entered into a land contract on July 29, 1965;
the notice of forfeiture was served on August 30, 1974. The trial
court's order of forfeiture was entered on May 14, 1985.85 Despite the
fact that the land contract had been in effect for over four years before
the effective date of the Act, the Kiser majority chose to follow the
result in Vukin.8" Judge Jones dissented, however, stating that:
The statutes in question are not solely remedial in nature. They create
substantive rights for the parties of a land installment contract, most
notably vendees in such contracts. To retrospectively apply these statutes
to land installment contracts executed prior to the effective dates of the
statutes would alter the contractual rights of the parties established by
the land contracts. Such modification of contractual rights without the
consent of those parties who had negotiated their terms should not and
87
can not be allowed.

79. Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07; see also supra text accompanying notes 135-88.
80. No. 3340 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Sept. 15, 1982) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
81. No. C85-06-39 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
82. Vukin, No. 3340 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Sept. 15, 1982) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Kiser, No. C85-06-39 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
86. Id.
87. Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
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In Kiser v. Coleman,88 the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with Judge
Jones' dissent and held that the Act does not apply to land contracts
entered into before the effective date of the Act. 89 The Ohio Supreme
Court reasoned that* "new substantive rights are created by R.C.
5313.07"9 0 so that to retrospectively apply the Act "would destroy the
vested rights of appellants to foreclosure [sic] according to the terms of
their contract, i.e. upon default and without judicial process."' The
Kiser court concluded that such a retrospective application of the Act
would violate "Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution which
prohibits the enactment of retroactive laws or laws impairing the obligation of contracts. 9 2
The Ohio Supreme Court confused the very remedies it held could
not be changed---contractual forfeiture versus statutory foreclosure. A
vendor, however, could not institute foreclosure without bringing a judicial action and the court meant to refer to "forfeiture" as the remedy
precluded the vendors in Kiser by application of the statute. The court
viewed forfeiture as being an important and substantive right.
2.

Improvement of the Land by a "Dwelling"

One of the least complex provisions of the Act is that it applies
only to "real property located in this state improved by virtue of a
dwelling having been erected on the real property." 93 Particularly when
the "dwelling" requirement was limited to contracts on which the
purchase price was less than $30,000,11 it was easy to argue that the
Act referred to a single dwelling unit. Since the Act was amended in
1980 and the $30,000 limit was removed,95 however, the courts have
not found this provision easy to apply. This subsection discusses cases
which have considered the dwelling provision of the Act and have ignored its requirements.
a.

Refusal to Apply the Act

In a thoughtful and well-written opinion which touched on several
land contract issues, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, in

88. 28 Ohio St. 3d 259, 503 N.E.2d 753 (1986).
89. Id. at 263, 503 N.E.2d at 756-57.
90. Id. at 263, 503 N.E.2d at 756.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 263, 503 N.E.2d at 757.
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(B). It seemed easy enough to me as I wrote the 1983
article. In the first two paragraphs of the 1983 article I juxtaposed "installment land contracts for
the sale of residential real property" and "land contracts concerning property not improved by a
dwelling" without explanation. Durham, supra note 4, at 397.
94. See Durham, supra note 4, at 425; supra note 3.
95. See Durham, supra note 4, at 425; supra note 3.
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.Johnson v. Maxwell,9" upheld the trial court's refusal to apply the Act
when there was no evidence that there was a dwelling on the land.9 7
The Johnson court stated one basis for interpreting the dwelling requirement, "[w]e have previously recognized that the use of the word
'dwelling' in this statute results in a distinction being made between
residential and commercial properties." 9' 8 Although the Johnson court
had little difficulty in interpreting the Act, 9 prior cases created greater
difficulty for the courts than that faced by the court in Johnson. Those
cases are the subject of the remainder of this section.
b.

"Residential" Property

At least four Ohio cases have held that land contracts for parcels
of land improved by apartment buildings are covered by the Act. In
Shone v. Griffis, 100 the Court of Appeals for the Second District applied O.R.C. section 5313.10 which limits further actions by vendors,
to prohibit a deficiency judgment by the vendor after the trial court
ordered foreclosure of an apartment building.10 1 The Shone court acknowledged the impact which the Act had on its decision, noting that
the foreclosure remedy had been given to the vendor by the Act.1 2 The
court held that the act's limitation on vendor remedies amounted to a
"denial of jurisdiction" of the court of common pleas to allow a deficiency action.10 3
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth District held, in Akron First
Seventh Day Adventist Church v. Smith,1 0 4 that the Act applied to
land improved by multi-family buildings.10 5 In that case, the church
had sold three parcels improved by three buildings with a total of seven
dwelling units to Smith and Neidert in exchange for cash and a note,
with the note secured by a mortgage on the parcels.1 6 Smith and

96. Nos. 2354 and 2374 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Aug. 10, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id. at 5-6.
99. The court noted "the trial court found that '[t]here is no dispute that no dwelling exists
on the land covered by the contract in question .. "Id. at 6.
100. No. 8252 (C.P. No. 81-96) (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Feb. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio
library, All Cases file).
101. Id. For a discussion of § 5313.10, see infra text accompanying notes 236-83.
102. Shone, No. 8252 (C.P. No. 81-96) (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Feb. 2, 1984) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, All Cases file).
103. Id.
104. No. 11577 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Sept. 27, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Neidert then sold the parcels to Dubravcic by a land contract.10 7 The
court held that the land contract was covered by the Act, thereby giving Dubravcic an action against Smith and Neidert for violation of provisions of the Act.' 0 8
In DiYorio v. Porter,'0 ' and in Tanner v. Fulk,"' n the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District held that the Act merely distinguishes
between commercial and residential uses.' In Tanner, a case involving
both the granting of forfeiture" 2 and damages after forfeiture," 3 the
court considered the commercial-residential distinction as settled.
Without citing any authority, the Tanner court stated, "[f]irst and
foremost, this is a land contract forfeiture case controlled by R.C.
5313."111 The court then proceeded to decide the case with no more
than a reference to the fact that the apartment building on the property contained eight units." 5
Finally, another court took the foregoing reasoning one step further. In Keene v. Schnetz,"1' a published opinion from the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth District, the court applied the Act to land improved by a trailer park. The Keene court did not mention what improvements were on the land and did not discuss why the Act was applicable. The only way to determine the nature of the improvements is
to review the findings of fact in the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in a
related case with the same caption" 7 which begins by stating, "Appellant, Fred Schmitt, a real estate broker, negotiated the sale of a trailer
park."" 8 The applicability of the Act was not before the Ohio Supreme
Court. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the ease with which the
Keene court applied the Act to the case.
The aforementioned cases leave the impression that the courts prefer the certainty of the Act's remedies. In each of the cases the court

107. Id.
108. Id. For a discussion of the nature of the damage action, see infra text accompanying
notes 269-83.
109. No. 81 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. June 24, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
110. No. 2297 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Aug. 1, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
11l. Id.; DiYorio, No. 81 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. June 24, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
112. For a discussion of the granting of forfeiture in actions brought under the Act, see
infra text accompanying notes 189-35.
113. For a discussion of the granting of damages to vendors, see infra text accompanying
notes 269-83.
114. Tanner, No. 2297 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Aug. 1, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
115. Id.
116. 13 Ohio App. 3d 87, 468 N.E.2d 125 (1983).
117. See Keene v. Schnetz, II Ohio St. 3d 35, 462 N.E.2d 1381 (1984).
118. Id. at 35, 462 N.E.2d at 1382.
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was faced with Ohio's uncertain common law; however, by applying the
Act the court was able to dispose of the actions with certainty. Once
again it can be argued that because O.R.C. section 5313.01(B) requires
that property covered by the Act be "improved by virtue of a dwelling
having been erected on the real property,"' 1 9 the legislature intended
for the Act to apply only to land improved by a single dwelling. That
argument is further advanced by the fact that the Act originally was
limited to land contracts with purchase prices of under $30,000.12'
Some courts, however, have read the Act more broadly and thus have
provided a more certain basis for deciding the cases before them.
c.

Non-Residential Property

There are four cases which may have applied the Act to non-residential property. 2 ' "May have" is appropriate because the courts in all
of the cases do not make clear what improvements, if any, are on the
property. Nonetheless, the courts are applying the Act when possible in
order to decide cases under the relatively certain provisions of the Act.
In Keene, which is discussed above,' 2 2 the court applied the Act to
land improved by a trailer park, but without mentioning the nature of
the improvements on the land. Similarly, in Sours v. Cogar,123 the only
hint given by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District is that the
land is referred to as "Lot 31 in Salt Fork Estate" and the purchase
price in 1977 was only $5,500.124 In Young v. Hodapp,125 the Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth District merely stated that the land is "7.5
acres of a tract of land located in Lemon Township.' 26
The case in which it seems most likely that the court applied the
Act to a land contract with non-residential improvements is Solar Enterprises v. Snyder. 27 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
District stated that the property was on Front Street in Cuyahoga
Falls, that the vendor was Solar Enterprises, and that the vendee was

119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01(B) (emphasis added).
120. 1969 Ohio Laws 424, 425 (effective Nov. 25, 1969).
121. Young v. Hodapp, No. 85-08-094 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 29, 1986) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, All Cases file); Solar Enters. v. Snyder, No. 12476 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Aug.
27, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file); Keene, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 87, 468 N.E.2d at
125; Sours v. Cogar, No. 657 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Dec. 2, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
123. No. 657 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Dec. 2, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
124. Id.
125. No. 85-08-094 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
126. Id.
127. No. 12476 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Aug. 27, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
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Linda Snyder. l2 8 Solar Enterprises named as defendants Snyder, Ronald Wells, and Ronald Wells, dba R & L Auto Service.129 Despite the
indications that the property was being used as a place of business, the
court nevertheless applied the provisions of the Act.
There may be nothing to be drawn from these cases other than
that they are either aberrant or unclear. There, in fact, may be a
"dwelling" on each parcel. A strong argument can be made from all
the cases discussed in this section, however, that the Act provides an
alluring set of relatively certain rules Which the courts are very willing
to apply.
B.

Foreclosure and Forfeiture Under the Act

Several issues have arisen in cases involving direct enforcement of
the primary remedies afforded a vendor by the Act-foreclosure and
forfeiture. After determining whether the Act applies, the courts must
decide what to make of the various provisions of the Act which direct
when a vendor must foreclose rather than when forfeiture is applicable.
Normally the vendor will opt for forfeiture if that remedy is available.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District held, in Clifton
v. Malone,130 that the Act does not prevent a vendor from obtaining
foreclosure in a case where the vendor could obtain forfeiture.1 ' The
options the vendor and vendee have are addressed in the cases discussed below.
1. 20% Payment Requirement for Foreclosure
Three courts of appeals have interpreted the 20% requirement in
similar cases. 3 2 In one case the trial court denied forfeiture and ordered foreclosure.' 33 In the other two cases" the trial courts granted
forfeiture and the vendees appealed, asserting that the vendors were
precluded from obtaining forfeiture and had to foreclose because the
vendees had "paid toward the purchase price a total sum equal to or in

128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
No. 429 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Nov. 22, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases

file).
131. Id.
132. See Smith v. Blackburn, 31 Ohio App. 3d 251, 511 N.E.2d 132 (1987); Burdge v.
Welsh, No. 82AP-846 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. Feb. 22, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file); Grilliot v. Hill, No. 7717 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Oct. 1, 1982) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
133. See Smith, 31 Ohio App. 3d at 251, 511 N.E.2d at 132.
134. See Burdge, No. 82AP-846 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. Feb. 22, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio
library, All Cases file); Grilliot, No. 7717 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Oct. 1,1982) (LEXIS, Ohio
library, All Cases file).
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excess of twenty per cent thereof."'' 6 Further, in all three cases the
vendees argued that the 20% should include interest payments as well
as principal payments. 3 '
The two forfeiture cases, Grilliot v. Hill" 7 and Burdge v.
Welsh, 138 are straightforward. In each case the trial court declared a
forfeiture after finding that the vendee had paid less than 20% of the
principal but that payments of principal and interest totaled more than
20% of the purchase price. 39 In each case, the court of appeals held
that purchase price meant principal, not principal and interest. 4
On the other hand, in Smith v. Blackburn,'4 ' a reported opinion
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, Blackburn, the vendee,
went beyond asserting just that interest she had paid should be added
to the principal paid in calculating the 20%. In determining whether
she had paid 20% of the $20,000 purchase price, Blackburn asserted
that the court also should consider insurance premiums and real estate
taxes paid."' The trial court accepted Blackburn's argument and or43
dered foreclosure.'
The Blackburn court stated that "R.C. 5313.07 is clear and unambiguous on its face."' 44 Because the statute does not define purchase
price, the court looked at the normal meaning of the term and to the
amount stated as the purchase price in the contract.145 Although the
contract did not state the purchase price, the court noted that the 10%
down payment of $2,000 was based on $20,000, the monthly payments
were based on the remaining $18,000, and the value of the premises for
insurance purposes was stated to be $20,000.14' The court rejected the
inclusion of anything other than principal in the calculation of the percentage of the purchase price which had been paid, and stated, "[t]he
interest was agreed to, but, as interest on the remaining balance of
$18,000, not as a part of the purchase price. This distinction must be

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07.
136. Smith, 31 Ohio App. 3d at 253, 511 N.E.2d at 133-34; Burdge, No. 82AP-846 (Ohio
Ct. App., 10th Dist. Feb. 22, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file); Grilliot, No. 7717
(Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Oct. 1, 1982) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
137. No. 7717 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Oct. 1, 1982) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
138. No. 82AP-846 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. Feb. 22, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
139. Id.; Grilliot, No. 7717 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Oct. 1, 1982) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
140. Id.
141. 31 Ohio App. 3d 251, 511 N.E.2d 132 (1987).
142. Id. at 253, 511 N.E.2d at 134.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
135.
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made in order to give the statute the remedial effect intended by the
legislature." 4 7 The court calculated that Blackburn had paid $3,746.30
in principal, or just $253.70 short of the $4,000 which constituted 20%
of the $20,000 purchase price, and remanded the case for further consideration by the Municipal Court.'4 8
The most interesting aspect of Smith is not the basic holding of
the case. The holding seems to be the only reasonable reading that can
be given to the statute. In remanding the case, however, the court did
more than just tell the municipal court to find that 20% had not been
paid. The court of appeals directed the municipal court to consider the
effect of any additional payments made by Blackburn while the appeal
was pending.'4 Although the Blackburn court did state that it was including the recalculation of the 20% in its order because it was the
vendor who had chosen to appeal rather than foreclose, 150 the dissenting opinion argued that, "[t]o hold that such payments [while the appeal was pending] should be included in the twenty-percent calculation
so as to preclude the statutory remedy of forfeiture would render R.C.
151
5313.07 nugatory.'
The dissent is correct, at least as to the effect the court's holding
will have in cases where the vendee has paid close to 20% of the
purchase price. No matter how equitable requiring foreclosure might
be,' 52 or how much the majority wanted to avoid forfeiture because of
the amount Blackburn had paid, to allow payments made by the vendee
after forfeiture has been declared 53 would allow such a vendee to avoid
forfeiture by dragging out the proceedings.
As a final note on the 20% requirement, in Harpley v. Ahwajee,'5
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District allowed the vendor to assert the vendee's waiver of the Act's requirement of foreclosure when
more than 20 % of the purchase price had been paid.155 In Harpley, to
settle a suit by the vendor which claimed that the vendee was in default, the vendee entered into a consent decree which modified the

147. Id. (emphasis in original).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 254, 511 N.E.2d at 134.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 284, 511 N.E.2d at 135 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
152. See Durham, supra note 4, at 431-33.
153. I am assuming that the vendor either has been ordered by the court to accept the
payments, or that the payments are being held by the court pending the outcome of the appeal. If
the vendor accepts payments after declaring forfeiture there is a good argument that he has
waived his right to forfeiture. NELSON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra note 6, §3.29, at 93-95.
154. No. 14162 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. November 29, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
155. Id.
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terms of the contract and required the vendee to sign a quit claim deed
which was deposited with the vendor's attorney with instructions that it
was to be recorded if the vendee defaulted in the future. 156 The vendee
later defaulted by submitting a check which was dishonored by the vendee's bank and the vendor's attorney recorded the deed.1 57 The vendee
brought suit claiming, among other things, that the vendor's only remedy was foreclosure because at the time of the default the vendee had
paid more than 20% of the purchase price.1 58
The court of appeals disagreed, stating that "[a] party may waive
any right created by contract, statute or constitution."1'59 The court
then held that the quit claim deed was a waiver of the right to foreclo16
sure, as well as of the right to receive notices required by the Act. 1
The holding of the court of appeals in Harpley is disturbing. 6 1
While it is undoubtedly correct that a party can waive statutory rights,
in a mortgage the mortgagor's right to force foreclosure normally cannot be waived until after a default.1 6 Once a vendee has paid more
than 20% of the purchase price, the Act places him in exactly the
same position as a mortgagor. 63 In Harpley, because the parties settled
the first suit by the vendor, there was no longer a default. Therefore,
the waiver allowed by the court effectively waived the right to foreclosure before the default which allowed the vendor to record the vendee's
quit claim deed. This is in direct conflict with established mortgage
law.
2.

Use of Foreclosure Under the Act

There have been few cases before the Ohio courts of appeals involving a trial court order of foreclosure. With the exception of a dispute over what constitutes payment of 20% of the purchase price
under O.R.C. section 5313.07,164 any other appeal of a case in which
foreclosure is ordered likely will involve issues other than the foreclosure remedy itself. On the one hand, if the vendor has been ordered to

156.

Id.

157.

Id.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. NELSON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra note 6, § 3.3, at 39-41.
163. O.R.C. section 5313.07 states that if the vendee has paid on the contract for five years
or more and has paid at least 20% of the purchase price "the vendor may recover possession of his
property only by use of a proceeding for foreclosure and judicial sale of the foreclosed property as
provided in section 2323.07 of the Revised Code." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.07. Section
2323.07 is entitled "Sale of foreclosed property" and is Ohio's basic mortgage foreclosure procedure. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.07 (Anderson 1981).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 132-63.
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proceed to foreclosure, her only complaint might be that she is entitled
to some remedy other than foreclosure. On the other hand, if the vendee has been subjected to foreclosure her only complaint might be that
she has some equitable defense to any declaration of default. The latter
situation is the subject of three cases considered by the courts of appeals in which the vendees asserted equitable grounds for avoiding
foreclosure.16 5
In Williams v. Shenefield,166 Shenefield, the vendee, made a
$10,000 down payment on a purchase price of $36,000.167 There apparently were several promises made by Williams, the vendor, which he
breached.16 8 The vendor's unkept promises included recording the land
contract, supplying water while a new well was drilled, delivery of possession, and the timely issuing of statements of account. 6 9 On the other
hand, Shenefield had difficulty making payments.170 Williams sued for
foreclosure and Shenefield sued for specific performance without
tendering payment of the balance of the purchase price. 7 ' The trial
court ordered foreclosure.' 7 The court of appeals rejected Shenefield's
claim that Williams' breaches equitably prevented Williams from obtaining foreclosure and affirmed the foreclosure order of the trial
73
court.1
Keene, a published opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
District, which was discussed earlier, 74 and the decision by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth District in Albright v. Cochran, 75 involved
decrees of foreclosure even though the land contracts did not contain
acceleration clauses.176 Both courts quoted, but did not further discuss,
the language of the land contracts pertaining to default. The default
clauses in the two land contracts were identical: "If any installment
payment to be made by the Vendee under the terms of this contract is

165. See Williams v. Shenefield, No. 680 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. July 28, 1988) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, All Cases file); Albright v. Cochran, No. 613 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. March 2,
1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file); Keene, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 87, 468 N.E.2d at 125.
166. No. 680 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. July 28, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
175. No. 613 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Mar. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
176. An "acceleration clause" is defined as, "a provision or clause in a mortgage, note,
bond, deed of trust, or other credit agreement, which allows a lender the opportunity to call monies due under the instrument." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 12 (5th ed. 1979).
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not paid by the Vendee when due or within thirty (30) days thereafter,
the Vendor may initiate forfeiture of the interest of the Vendee in default, as provided by law." 1"
One could argue that this clause is de facto an acceleration clause
because forfeiture ends the relationship. On the other hand, taken literally and without reference to the statute, the contract clause would allow the vendor to declare forfeiture of the vendee's interest without the
vendee having the right either to reinstate the contract or to pay the
contract balance and receive a deed. The courts, therefore, turned to
the statute in order to determine how to interpret the contract
language.
In Keene, both the trial court and the court of appeals appear to
have confused forfeiture and foreclosure. The action was originally
brought seeking forfeiture, but it appears from the facts recited in the
case that more than 20% of the purchase price had been paid when the
vendees defaulted.1 78 The Schnetzes, the vendees, asserted that because
there was no acceleration clause .in the land contract they could pay
any missed payments during the ten day notice period required by
O.R.C. section 5313.06 and have the contract reinstated. 79
The trial court ordered foreclosure by referring to the statutory
provisions for forfeiture, 80 and the court of appeals joined in the trial
court's confusion. Despite the uncertainty about which provision of the
Act controlled, the Keene court resolved the issue about the lack of an
acceleration clause with the following statement: "An acceleration
clause is not a prerequisite to the vendor's enforcement of a forfeiture
of a vendee's interest in a land installment contract. R.C. 5313.05 and
5313.06 create a statutory right to forfeiture when certain conditions
are met." 18 1 The Keene court missed the point, however, because without an acceleration clause, the only default was on the payments not
paid, not on the entire balance. Whether there was a statutory right to

177. Keene, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 88, 468 N.E.2d at 126.
178. Id. The land contract was executed on May 21, 1977. The purchase price was
$175,000 with a $20,000 down payment, and the $155,000 loan balance bore interest at the rate
of 7% per annum. The vendees agreed to make payments of $1,200 per month starting on July 5,
1977, and the court states that there was not a default until May 6, 1982. Id. Applying each
payment to interest first and the balance to principal, and assuming that no payments were made
after the February, 1982 payment because the court states that payments were 60 days in default,
over $19,000 in principal would have been paid. When added to the $20,000 downpayment, the
amount of principal paid totals over $39,000, which is over 22% of the purchase price of
$175,000. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 89, 468 N.E.2d at 127; see also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.05, 5313.06
(Anderson 1953). For a discussion of the ten day period, see supra text accompanying notes
42-47.
181. Keene, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 89, 468 N.E.2d at 127.
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forfeiture after the default arguably does not impact on whether the
vendor could accelerate and rely upon the Act's foreclosure section.
The majority of the court emphasized that, if during the ten day
period required by O.R.C. section 5313.06 the vendee was allowed to
make back payments and reinstate the land contract, then the ten day
period was a mere extension of the thirty day period for reinstatement
required by O.R.C. section 5313.05.18 The court stated:
We note that R.C. 5313.05 permits a vendee to avoid forfeiture by making "all payments currently due under the contract" within thirty days of
default. By contrast, R.C. 5313.06(C) allows a vendee to prevent forfeiture by performing "the terms and conditions of the contract within ten
days of the completed service of notice." Thus, we believe that the statutes give a vendee two opportunities to avoid foreclosure. The vendee
may cure his default by making all payments currently due within the
thirty days of default. However, if the vendee waits beyond the thirtyday grace period and forces the vendor to initiate proceedings pursuant
to R.C. 5313.06, he can avoid forfeiture only by performing the terms of
the contract-i.e., satisfying his entire obligation-within ten days of the
receipt of the vendor's note. Had the legislature intended to give the vendee the right to avoid forfeiture after receiving the vendor's notice
merely by becoming current in his payments, the language found in R.C.
5313.05 would have been repeated in R.C. 5313.06(C).183
The dissent in Keene cut through the confusion which the majority
created by observing that even during the ten day period all the "terms
of the contract" require is the fulfillment of obligations which are presently required by the contract." 4 If there is no acceleration clause, the
entire principal is not yet due according to the "terms of the contract."
The majority undoubtedly is correct that the legislature used different
language in the two statutes. The Act, however, is filled with inconsistencies, at least one of which is critical.to its interpretation. 8 5 The difference in language between O.R.C. sections 5313.05 and 5313.06 is
not great enough to compel a court to allow acceleration in the absence
of an acceleration clause.
The court in Albright took a different route to finding that there
was acceleration despite the lack of an acceleration clause. After pointing out that the vendor could have brought suit for the delinquent in-

182. Id.
183. Id at 89-90, 468 N.E.2d at 127-28.
184. Id. at 90, 468 N.E.2d at 128.
185. O.R.C. section 5313.07 requires foreclosure if the land contract has been in effect at
least five years or 20% or more of the purchase price has been paid, while section 5313.08 allows
forfeiture if the land contract has been in effect less than five years. The 1983 article asserted that
section 5313.07 should control. Durham, supra note 4, at 427.
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stallment only, 186 a right the vendor had at common law, the court
went on to hold that O.R.C. section 5313.07 extends to the vendor the
right to foreclose on the entire debt upon any default in the making of
monthly payments.' 8 7
While the result in Albright is less draconian than that in Keene,
where the court stated the vendor has the right to declare a "forfeiture" upon any default, the result in these cases is the same. In each
case the vendor did not include an acceleration clause in his contract,
but he was allowed to accelerate and obtain foreclosure. The better
position is that of the dissent in Keene, that, just as in mortgage law,
absent an acceleration clause all that is due is any unpaid installment
and the court must fashion its remedy based upon that fact. 8
3. Use of Forfeiture Under the Act
There have been several cases decided by the courts of appeals in
which the vendees appealed trial court judgments granting forfeiture,
but no such cases have been decided by the Ohio Supreme Court. In
addition, there are more forfeiture cases than foreclosure cases, which
can be explained in at least two ways: First, as stated above, it seems to
be unlikely that a vendee will appeal a foreclosure judgment.' 89 On the
other hand, it seems much more likely a vendee will appeal a forfeiture
judgment because of the greater loss represented by forfeiture. Second,
it is possible that the trial courts are granting large numbers of forfeitures, perhaps more than foreclosures, so that the difference in the number of foreclosure and forefeiture cases merely represents roughly the
same percentage of different numbers.
There is a persistent theme running through the forfeiture cases to
the effect that the forfeiture remedy contained in O.R.C. section
5313.08 is different from the common law forfeiture remedy. This passage from Shriver v. Grabenstetter'90 is an instructive example:
The forfeiture action initiated by the plaintiffs is a purely statutory action, which did not exist at common law, devised to solve problems previously existing in the event of a vendee's default, in restoring to the ven-

186. Albright. No. 613 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Mar. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file). At the time the case was decided there only was. one annual installment of $10,000
which was delinquent. The vendees insisted they could pay the $10,000 and be reinstated, and the
vendors insisted that they could foreclose unless the vendees paid the entire principal due on the
land contract.
187. Alb right, No. 613 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Mar. 2, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
188. Keene, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 89, 468 N.E.2d at 127.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 132-63.
190. No. 13-87-13 (Ohio Ct. App., 3d Dist. May 18, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
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dor the equitable title and right to possession which had passed to the
vendee upon the execution of a land installment contract."'
Another court of appeals judge was even more strong in his dissent
in Blackburn, a reported case which was discussed earlier. 192 In rejecting the majority's direction to the trial court to consider on remand
any payments made while the appeal was pending in determining
whether the vendee had paid 20% of the purchase price, Judge Stephenson ended his dissent by stating, "I would reverse and enter judgment for appellants as a matter of law," 1 93 indicating that because the
literal statutory requirement had been met, the judge was of the opinion that the vendor had an absolute right to forfeiture.
At least one court of appeals has adopted the rigid view of the
Act's requirements for forfeiture and foreclosure stated by the court in
Keene, which was discussed above.1 94 In Burdge v. Welsh,'9 5 a case discussed earlier,' 9 6 the Welshes, the vendees, appealed the trial court's
granting of forfeiture on the vendor's motion for summary judgment.197
The court of appeals upheld the trial court and stated:
There was no dispute but that defendants were in default of the land
contract and that they were provided the proper notices to vacate the
premises. There was also no dispute about the purchase price or the payments.... [S]ummary judgment is applicable in an appropriate case in

a forcible entry and detainer action. 9

In two other cases, both of which have been discussed previously,
Grilliot v.Hill'9 9 and Tanner v. Fulk 0 0 the trial courts granted forfeiture and the vendee appealed on grounds other than the awarding of
forfeiture. In both cases the court of appeals upheld the trial court.
Despite the factual differences among the cases, the bottom line in each
case was that the vendee's interest was forfeited.

191. Id.
192. 31 Ohio App. 3d at 251, 511 N.E.2d at 132; see also supra text accompanying notes
141-53.
193. 31 Ohio App. 3d at 254, 511 N.E.2d at 135.
194. 13 Ohio App. 3d at 87, 468 N.E.2d at 125; see also supra text accompanying notes
174-85.
195. No. 82AP-846 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. Feb. 22, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
197. Welsh, No. 82AP-846 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. Feb. 22, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
198. Id.
199. No. 7715 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d Dist. Oct. 1, 1982) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file);
see also supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
200. No. 2297 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Aug. 1, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file); see also supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
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Three other courts of appeals have upheld forfeiture in cases in
which the vendees' actions likely prejudiced their interests. In Harpley
v. Ahwajee,2 'O the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District allowed forfeiture in a case where the vendee had settled a previous action brought
by the vendor by signing a quit claim deed which was deposited with
the vendor's attorney. 2 The court treated the deed as a waiver of any
statutory rights the vendee might have and enforced the forfeiture. 0 3
In Butler v. Michel,2 °4 a published opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, the court was presented with appeals by
both the vendors and the vendees contesting the trial court's handling
of claims for damages by both parties. The vendees undoubtedly destroyed any opportunity they might have had to avoid forfeiture by
abandoning the property while the action was pending before the trial
court. The vendors' action for forcible entry and detainer was dismissed, and the case became merely an action for damages.2 0 5
In Hentosh v. Vrontos2 0 6 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
District was presented with some equities favoring the vendees, but also
a great deal of inaction and unwillingness to compromise. The vendees
first defaulted and then appeared before a referee and admitted that
they were in default on the land contract, that they had received the
required notices, and that "the deficiency had not been corrected." ' '
While the referee found that the vendees had attempted to correct the
deficiencies, the referee also found they still were in default. 0 8 The referee recommended forfeiture. 09
In Hentosh, the vendor offered three different bases for settling the
case: "(1) payment in full for the remaining balance of the land installment contract, (2) or a writ of restitution with cancellation of the land
installment contract, or (3) payment of their attorney fees with an order of cancellation should the payments ever be late."21 0 The vendees
refused to settle and pressed their defense that they had attempted in
good faith to bring the land contract current and argued that their efforts were sufficient to avoid forfeiture. The trial. court granted

201.

No. 14162 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Nov. 29, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
14 Ohio App. 3d 116, 470 N.E.2d 217 (1984).
Id. at 117, 470 N.E.2d at 219.
No. 3481 (Ohio Ct. App., I Ith Dist. Sept. 27, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases

207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

file).

file).
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forfeiture."1 '
The Hentosh court cited Keene 12 for the proposition that a vendee
under a land installment contract has two opportunities to avoid forfeiture or foreclosure.21 3 The court went on to describe the two
opportunities:
The vendee may cure his default by making all payments currently due
within thirty days of the default. However, if the vendee waits beyond
the thirty day grace period and forces the vendor to initiate proceedings
pursuant to R.C. 5313.06, he can avoid forfeiture only by performing the
terms of the contract, i.e., satisfying his entire obligation within ten days
of receipt of the vendor's notice.214
In response to the vendees' claim that the trial court erred in
granting forfeiture on the vendors' motion for summary judgment, the
court of appeals responded that it was not error because the vendees
had no defense.21 5 To the court of appeals, it was enough that the vendors took a firm position and stuck to it. Once the vendees did not
perform, their rights were terminated.21 6 Hentosh, therefore, is an interesting case because the vendees made some effort to bring the land
contract current, but they also rejected a reasonable offer by the vendors to reinstate the contract. The court of appeals' language is absolute, and the vendees did little to make their case attractive.
In Shriver, a case discussed earlier,21 7 the court of appeals seemed
quite willing, in general, to uphold a trial court's grant of forfeiture.21 8
The interesting aspect of the case is that a willing court of appeals did
not uphold the grant of forfeiture because the vendor had also breached
the agreement even though the vendee clearly was in default on the
land contract. First, the court of appeals stated that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to deny forfeiture on equitable
grounds.21 " Second, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred
in failing to consider that the vendor had defaulted in his obligations
under the land contract, thereby depriving the vendor of the right to
forfeiture despite the fact that the vendee was not current in her pay-

211. Id.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 174-85.
213. Keene, 13 Ohio App. 3d at 89, 468 N.E.2d at 127-28.
214. Id. at 89, 468 N.E.2d at 128.
215. Hentosh, No. 3481 (Ohio Ct. App., 11th Dist. Sept. 27, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
216. Id.
217. No. 13-87-13 (Ohio Ct. App., 3d Dist. May 18, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file); see also supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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ments required by the land contract. 2 '
Finally, there has been at least one case in which a court of appeals has reversed on equitable grounds a trial court's granting of forfeiture in accordance with the clear language of the Act. In Krivins v.
Smyers,22 1 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District was confronted
with a situation in which the vendee had responded to a demand for an
overdue payment for the month of April with a check which was dishonored, had defaulted on the May payment, and then had failed to
timely make the June payment. 2 The trial court granted the vendor's
request for forfeiture, but the court of appeals reversed.22
The court of appeals gave three equal reasons for its decision. The
court's first reason was based on equities in the vendee's favor. The tenday notice22 sent to the vendees was defective for several reasons. The
notice stated that all three payments would have to be paid to avoid
forfeiture, while only the first two were in default, the third still being
within the grace period allowed by the land contract. 2 5 The court was
reading the notice requirement strictly because the notice was accurate
in that the June payment was due, but it was inaccurate in that the
June payment was not yet in default. Further, the notice was sent on
June 1 and stated that all payments were 30 days overdue; the court
could have said that the error was obvious and that the notice was sufficient as to the April and May payments. 226 Finally, the court likely was
impressed by the fact that the vendees offered a certified check for the
April and May payments on June 23rd, which was beyond the ten days
but the court likely interpreted as evidence of the vendee's good faith.
The Krivins court did not stop with this equitable point, however,
but went on to state two more bases for reversing the trial court's decision. The court stated that, since a forfeiture would permit the vendors
to retain all the vendees' payments and regain clear title to the land, a
penalty would result because the land contract stated that the monthly
payments were the fair rental value of the property and the vendors
would be able to retain those payments as well as the vendees' $5,000
downpayment. 227 The court cited a 1922 land contract case for the pro-

220.
221.

Id.
No. 9935 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases

file).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. The court was referring to the ten-day notice required by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5313.06 (Anderson 1988).
225. Krivins, No. 9935 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
226. Id.
227. Id
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position that "a forfeiture will not be enforced if liquidated damages
constitute a penalty. 22 8
The Krivins court then delved deeply into other pre-Act land contract cases in stating that "forfeitures are highly disfavored by the
law."' 229 Among other cases, the court cited the 1919 Ohio court of
appeals case, Curtis v. Factory Site Co.,2 30 for the proposition that forfeiture should be denied "unless the failure [to make payments] is intentional or it results in a loss to the vendor which cannot be compensated by interest. '231 In addition, the court cited a 1923 Ohio Supreme
Court decision, Norpac Realty Co. v. Schackne,2 3 2 for the proposition
that "[b]efore the forfeiture clause of a land contract may be enforced,
it must appear that the buyer is unable or unwilling to pay the remain2 33
ing installments.
Krivins is an interesting case because it indicates the willingness of
at least one court of appeals to employ equitable principles in deciding
land contract cases under the Act. Such a position is exactly what the
1983 article advocated, 3 ' but there is little evidence that other courts
of appeals have been doing it.
The forfeiture cases do offer some guidance for future cases, however, but less guidance than might initially appear. First, there is a
clear thread running through the forfeiture cases indicating that most
courts of appeals are willing to apply the Act fairly strictly and uphold
the granting of forfeiture by trial courts. Second, some courts of appeals are also willing to consider defenses raised by vendees, but only
within the context of the Act or common law areas other than land
contract law. Finally, at least one court of appeals employed common
law equitable bases for avoiding forfeiture under the Act.2 35
C.

Damage Actions Under the Act

Several sections of the Act refer to remedies available to vendors
or vendees, and many of them arguably define the types of damage
actions a party to a land contract may bring. The purpose of this sec228. Woloveck v. Schueler, 19 Ohio App. 210 (Summit Co. 1922); see also Durham, supra
note 4, at 422.
229. Krivins, No. 9935 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
230. 12 Ohio App. 148, 157 (1919); see also Durham, supra note 4, at 422.
231. Krivins, No. 9935 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
232. 107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923); see also Durham, supra note 4, at 422-23.
233. Krivins, No. 9935 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
234. Durham, supra note 4, at 438-40.
235. Krivins, No. 9935 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
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tion is to review the cases which have referred to the Act in determining the type and extent of damages which may be sought by either
vendors or vendees.
1. Vendor Damages
O.R.C. section 5313.10 limits the types of damage actions which
vendors can bring. That section, which was discussed earlier,2"' restricts damage actions brought by vendors who have obtained forfeiture
under O.R.C. section 5313.08 or foreclosure under O.R.C. section
5313.07 to "the difference between the amount paid by the vendee on
the contract and the fair rental value of the property plus an amount
for the deterioration or destruction of the property occasioned by the
vendee's use."'2 37 O.R.C. section 5313.10 both restricts and expands
vendors' rights. On the one hand, vendors' rights to deficiency actions
after foreclosure are severely limited; on the other hand, vendors now
have the right to damage actions after obtaining forfeiture.
The most litigated question appears to be whether a vendor who
forecloses on the vendee's interest in an action under O.R.C. section
5313.07 can also seek a deficiency judgment as part of the foreclosure
action or in a later action. The number of cases is not surprising because an Ohio mortgagee who forecloses on the mortgagor's interest
may, with some limitations, seek a deficiency. 38 The courts' interpretations of the Act are also not surprising. All Ohio courts of appeals that
have decided the issue have held that a vendor may not obtain a deficiency judgment with or after a foreclosure pursuant to section 5313.07
of the Act.2 39
If prohibiting deficiency judgments after statutory foreclosure was
the Act's bad news for vendors, the impact of the new prohibition was
to some degree lessened by the Act's allowing a new action for dam-

See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.10 (Anderson 1989).
A deficiency judgment is possible when the property is sold during the foreclosure action for less
then the amount owed by the borrower to the lender. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2329.08 (Anderson 1981).
239. There are two published opinions: Good Shepherd Baptist Church v. City of Columbus, 20 Ohio App. 3d 228, 485 N.E.2d 725 (1984), a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth District, which had previously issued an unpublished opinion in Leach v. Douglass, 82AP205 (Ohio Ct. App., 10th Dist. Feb. 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file) and Dalton v.
Acker, 5 Ohio App. 3d 150, 450 N.E.2d 725 (1984), a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth District. There are also unpublished opinions from four other courts of appeals: Frey v.
Hibbard, No. C-880300 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. May 10, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file); Dillon v. Shinnaberry, No. 15-83-14 (Ohio Ct. App., 3d Dist. Jan. 18, 1985) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, All Cases file); Kothera v. Stroupe, No. 11693 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Sept. 12,
1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file); and Steele v. Johnson, No. 1502 (Ohio Ct. App., 2d
Dist. Apr. 22, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
236.
237.
238.
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ages after foreclosure and extending that action to cases where the vendor has obtained statutory forfeiture. O.R.C. section 5313.10 allows the
vendor to bring an action for damages against the vendee after either
forfeiture or foreclosure.24
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth District, in Marvin v. Stemen,2 4 1 a published opinion, held that, even after the vendor has prevailed in a forfeiture action, the vendor could institute a new action
under section 5313.10.242 The Marvin court acknowledged that its decision departed from the common law rule, which held that obtaining
forfeiture was an exclusive election of remedies, but stated that "the
specific statutory language of R.C. 5313.10 holds otherwise. ' 2 43 Further, the court held that, although the vendor could have joined the
O.R.C. section 5313.10 action with the forfeiture action, it was not required.2 44 The court, therefore, treated the two actions as independent.
There have been several courts of appeals' cases in which the appellants have raised issues about computation of damages under O.R.C.
section 5313.10. In the only published decision on the subject, Butler, a
decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, 45 the vendees
made a down payment and all the required monthly payments on the
land contract, totaling $12,805.80, but failed to make the required balloon principal payment.24 The vendees vacated the premises before the
trial court granted forfeiture, but the trial court awarded the vendors
$2,500 for the vendees' holdover after default.24 7 The court of appeals
reversed the award of rent to the vendor and pointed out that the
amount stipulated in the land contract to be the fair rental value of the
premises was far greater than what the vendees had paid. 48 The Fifth
District Court of Appeals has followed the Butler court's strict application of the statute.24 9
In Frey v. Hibbard,25 0 a case in which the trial court had granted
forfeiture, the First District Court of Appeals accepted the trial court's
conclusion that fair rental value would be determined by adding the

240. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.10 (Anderson 1989).
241. 68 Ohio App. 2d 26, 426 N.E.2d 205 (1980); see also Durham, supra note 4, at 428.
242. Id. at 28, 426 N.E.2d at 207.
243. Id. at 28-29, 426 N.E.2d at 207.
244. Id. at 29, 426 N.E.2d at 207.
245. Butler, 14 Ohio App. 3d at 116, 470 N.E.2d at 217.
246. Id. at 118, 470 N.E.2d at 219.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 117-118, 470 N.E.2d at 219.
249. Tanner, No. 2297 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Aug. 1, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
250. No. C-880300 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. May 10, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
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amount of monthly payments to required payments for taxes, insurance
and water. The court of appeals then upheld the trial court's award to
the vendor of $2,224.62, which consisted of the six payments due from
the time the vendee stopped making payments to the date forfeiture
was declared, plus the payments made by the vendor for taxes, insur" ' The facts
ance and water.25
stated in the Frey decision do not indicate
that the vendee made a down payment and, therefore, the only payments made by the vendee and acknowledged by the court were those
stipulated in the contract to constitute fair rental value. The more important holding in the case, however, is that fair rental value is to be
calculated up to the date of the judicial grant of forfeiture if the vendee
is still in possession.
Wright v. Deetz,252 a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth District, involved the application of a provision in O.R.C. section
5313.10 which allows for damages for "deterioration or destruction of
the property occasioned by the vendee's use." 25' 3 In Wright, the house
improving the land was destroyed by fire. The land contract required
the vendee to maintain a fire insurance policy, which she failed to do.254
After the fire, the vendee ceased paying on the land contract. The trial
court in Wright awarded the vendor $6,000 in damages which it calculated by subtracting the market value of the property after the fire,
.$7,000, from the market value before the fire, $1 3,000.255 The court
did not mention any money paid by vendee on the land contract.
The court of appeals in Wright upheld the trial court's decision by
noting that the vendee did not contest the values used in making the
calculation.2 56 The result is troubling because the court of appeals applied the language "deterioration or destruction of the property" independently from "fair rental value" despite the fact that the two are
linked by a conjunctive "plus." O.R.C. section 5313.10 is clear in stating that foreclosure and forfeiture are "exclusive" remedies "unless the
vendee has paid an amount less than the fair rental value plus deterioration or destruction of property occasioned by the vendee's use.2 57 This
is one remedy, not two separable remedies, as held by the court in
Wright. The only way that "deterioration or destruction of property"
becomes a factor in granting damages to the vendor is when they are

251.
252.

Id.
No. 1844 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Aug. 7, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases

file).
253. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.10 (Anderson 1989).
254. Wright, No. 1844 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Aug. 7, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.10.
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added to fair rental value, and they cannot be considered
independently.
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth District has engaged in
a strained use of a liquidated damages clause to exclude from the
"amount paid by the vendee" the down payment which fhe vendee
made at the inception of the land contract. In Goodrich v. Sickelbaugh,25 8 the vendees defaulted on a balloon payment at the end of
the land contract. 5 9 The trial court granted forfeiture and considered
the vendees' suit for a refund of an excess of payments over fair rental
value2 60 along with the vendors' suit for damages under section
5313.10. The vendees had paid a total of $10,400, consisting of a
$2,000 down payment and 21 monthly payments of $400 each.2 61 The
trial court in Goodrich denied the vendee's request for a refund,2 62 but
awarded the vendors $1,330.95 for damages to the property and
$984.01 in rent from the date of default to the judicial declaration of
forfeiture. 6 3
The court of appeals in Goodrich turned to the liquidated damages
clause in the land contract. As the court phrased it, the clause provided, "that upon default all payments made by appellants are to be
retained by appellees as fixed and liquidated damages for non-performance by appellants of the agreement and as rent and compensation for
the use and occupancy of the premises."26 4 The court of appeals upheld
the trial court's determination that the vendees were not entitled to
have the down payment or payments for property taxes considered in
determining whether they had paid the fair rental value plus destruction.2 65 Therefore, the court of appeals in Goodrich affirmed the trial
court's award of damages for rent after default and for deterioration.2 6
The vendees in Goodrich argued that the liquidated damages
clause expired with the contract and that the vendors were, therefore,
limited to damages measured solely by O.R.C. section 5313.10; the result would then have been to deny any damages, since the $2,000 down
payment and tax payments exceeded the amount the trial court
awarded for rent and destruction. The court of appeals did not explain

258. No. L-85-194 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 21, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
259. Id.
260. See infra text accompanying notes 270-72.
261. Goodrich, No. L-85-194 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 21, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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its reasoning, but simply stated:
The amounts covered by the liquidated damage clause in the land installment contract have already been paid, and as such, may be retained by
the appellees. We find, as other courts have, that the bar in R.C.
5313.10 is plainly a bar to actions such as deficiency judgment actions.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court was correct in determining that
it was bound by the liquidated damage clause and thereby could not
permit appellants a set-off against 26the
total damages for the down pay7
ment or the real estate taxes paid.
It is difficult to comprehend the logic of the court of appeals in
Goodrich. Even if there is a liquidated damages clause in the land contract, the statute, which establishes a new remedy for vendors who have
obtained forfeiture, clearly states that the amount to be credited to the
vendee is "the amount paid by the vendee on the contract.''268 The
court should have considered all that was paid on the contract, which
at least included the $2,000 down payment. As to the property taxes,
the court is correct because property taxes are not paid "on the contract," i.e., to service interest or reduce the principal balance, even if
the contract requires that the taxes be paid.
The courts of appeals are having difficulty applying section
5313.10 of the Act. This is unfortunate; by interpreting the section, the
courts could assist practitioners in advising clients because the section
is such a departure from the common law. The difficulty the courts are
having in applying the section makes the section's unusual characteristics all the more harsh in their application in cases where the parties
expect to be afforded common law remedies.
2.

Vendee Damages

Two of the cases discussed above, Butler,2" 9 and Goodrich, 7 also
involved claims for refunds by the vendees of the amounts they had
paid in excess of the fair rental value of the property. In Butler, the
vendees appealed the trial court's refusal to return the down payment
to them."' In Goodrich, the vendees limited their appeal to the trial
court's award of damages to the vendors.27 2 In each case, the appellate
court appears to have been of the opinion that vendees who have had
their contracts declared forfeited are not entitled to damages. Since the

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
brary, All

Id. (citations omitted).
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5313.10 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 245-49.
See supra text accompanying notes 258-68.
Butler, 14 Ohio App. 3d at 117, 470 N.E.2d at 218.
Goodrich, No. 1-85-194 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Mar. 21, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio liCases file).
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vendees who have had their contracts declared forfeited are not entitled
to damages under Ohio common law,2 73 and because the Act did not
create any new rights after forfeiture for the vendee, the courts likely
are correct.
Another damage claim which some vendees have brought against
vendors concerns the vendors' breach of the technical sections of the
Act. O.R.C. section 5313.04 allows the vendee to enforce "Chapter
5313" against the vendor and states that "the court shall grant appropriate relief. '2 74 In Sours v. Cogar,2 7 5 the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that section 5313.04 specifically refers to the procedural requirements placed on the vendor in section 5313.03 to issue periodic
statements to the vendee of the status of the land contract. 76 While the
requirements of section 5313.03 were at issue in Sours, and the court's
holding concerns only that issue, the court's decision is too narrow.
O.R.C. section 5313.04 must refer to all of the vendor's obligations
under the Act and not just those contained in section 5313.03. The
Sours court also held that a vendor's technical violation of the Act's
requirements does not deny the vendor the ability to obtain forfeiture
of the land contract.2 77 Such a statement is another indication that the
courts consider statutory forfeiture to be a matter of right for a vendor
who has complied with the substantive terms of a land contract.
Two other courts of appeals' cases have dealt with the possible
consequences of a vendor's violation of the technical requirements of
the Act. In Akron First Seventh Day Adventist Church v. Smith, 27 the
Ninth District Court of Appeals applied section 5313.04 to violations of
section 5313.02,279 and concluded that the vendee has to prove actual
damage in order to be entitled to "appropriate relief.2 80 The allegation
of a violation of the statute, therefore, does not entitle the vendee to an

273.

NELSON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra

note 6, at 86-87.

274. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.04.
275. No. 657 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Dec. 2, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases file).
276. Id. O.R.C. section 5313.03 requires the vendor to issue annually, or up to two times a
year at the request of the vendee, a statement of "(A) The amount credited to principal and
interest; (B) The balance due." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.03.
277. Sours, No. 657 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Dec. 2, 1981) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
278. No. 11577 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Sept. 27, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
279. O.R.C. section 5313.02 sets forth the minimum requirements for a land contract. It
includes a prohibition on the vendor's placing a mortgage on the property for more than the
balance due on the land contract, requires the vendor to record the land contract within twenty
days of its signing, and states that land contracts shall conform to the statutory formalities for the

execution of deeds and mortgages.
280.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 5313.04.
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award of nominal damages. Finally, in Young v. Hodapp,28 1 the
Twelfth District Court of Appeals was faced with a trial court judgment that a land contract which does not comply with section 5313.02
could not be enforced by the vendee against the vendor.282 The court of
appeals reversed, stating that "a defectively executed land conveyance
is valid as between the parties. . . . Moreover, the statute was not
designed as a way for sellers to escape from contracts they wished to
void." 2" 3
D.

Vendor's Mortgage

One of the inherent risks to the vendee in entering into a land
contract is that the vendor, because she holds legal title, may voluntarily create a lien on the land or involuntarily cause a lien to be created
on the land. Two cases have applied the act while dealing with this
issue. In the first case, the vendor mortgaged the property which was
the subject of the land contract in violation of the Act's prohibition on
liens against the vendor's interest exceeding the amount due on the
land contract. In the second case, the vendor defaulted on the mortgage
which existed at the inception of the land contract; the issue before the
court was whether the mortgagee had to give notice of the foreclosure
to the land contract vendee.
1. Vendor's Mortgage in Violation of the Act
In Toledo Trust Co. v. Cole, 84 a published decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Third District, the following provision of O.R.C.
section 5313.02(B) was applied: "No vendor shall place a mortgage on
the property in an amount greater than the balance due on the contract
without the consent of the vendee." 2'85 The land contract in Toledo
Trust was for an amount equivalent to that due on the note secured by
the first mortgage on the property. The vendor then entered into a second mortgage.28 6 When the first mortgagee foreclosed, the land contract vendee and the second mortgagee both claimed second priority.2 87
The Toledo Trust court held that the second mortgage was void because, at the time it was entered into, the vendor had no mortgagable
288
interest in the property.

281. No. 85-08-094 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Dec. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 27 Ohio App. 3d 340, 500 N.E.2d 920 (1986).
285. Id. at 342, 500 N.E.2d at 922; see also OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.02(B).
286. Cole, 27 Ohio App. 3d at 341, 500 N.E.2d at 921.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 343, 500 N.E.2d at 923-94.
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The result in Toledo Trust carries out the intent of the Act to
protect vendees from unscrupulous vendors. Further, the result is the
only one which could carry out the intent of the Act-the land contract
was for the same amount as the first mortgage, and the vendor therefore had no equity interest in the property. Unfortunately, however, it
is difficult to predict how a court will decide the more difficult case
where the amount due on the land contract is more than that due on
the first mortgage, hence leaving the vendor with an equity interest in
the property, but the second mortgage is for more than the equity interest. A court could affirm the interest of the second mortgagee up to
the amount of the difference between the land contract balance and the
balance on the first mortgage, or the court could void the second mortgage. Either result can be defended. A court could allow the second
mortgage to be asserted up to the amount of the vendor's equity on the
theory that the vendee is not injured by having to pay the same amount
to a different creditor. Alternatively, a court could void the second
mortgage on the theory that, because the land contract was recorded,
as is required by the Act,2" 9 the second mortgagee had notice and
therefore cannot assert a mortgage which is invalid under the Act.
2.

Foreclosure of Vendor's Mortgage

In First Bank National Association v. 10546 Euclid Avenue,
Inc.,2 9 First Bank foreclosed its mortgage on property owned by
Fudge.2 91 First Bank served notice of the foreclosure on Fudge in September, 1984.292 Fudge later contended that this notice was improperly
served.29 3 Fudge, as vendor, entered into a land contract with Brooks,
as vendee, on November 30, 1984. The trial court issued an "order" of
foreclosure in November, 1985, which was later confirmed.2 94 In November, 1986, after the foreclosure sale had been confirmed, Brooks
filed a motion for relief from the judgment of the trial court, based at
least partially on the claimed improper notice to Fudge.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth District acknowledged that
Brooks, as the vendee, had an interest which entitled him to notice of
the fortclosure if his interest was of record when Fudge, the mortgagor
and vendor, was served. As it turned out, both the trial court and the
court of appeals determined that the September, 1984, notice had been

289.
290.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.02(C).
No. 2674 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th. Dist. June 29, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases

291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

file).
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properly served on Fudge.2 95 Therefore, Brooks was not entitled to receive notice of the foreclosure because he already had constructive notice of the pending foreclosure by application of the doctrine of lis
pendens.219
First Bank is an important case for two reasons. First, the court of
appeals recognized that vendees have significant interests which warrant protection. Second, despite the fact that Brooks, the vendee, lost
because of the application of the doctrine of lis pendens, the court
opined that the right to notice was necessary to effectuate rights extended to the vendee by the Act, including the right granted by section
5313.02(A)(13) for the vendee to pay the vendor's mortgage if the vendor defaults on the mortgage.29 7
IV.

COMMON LAW LAND CONTRACT CASES

There have been very few Ohio Supreme Court or courts of appeals cases concerning land contract defaults outside of the Act since
the 1983 article was published. Some of the cases which were decided,
however, are significant and add to the fabric of Ohio land contract
law. The lack of appellate cases may indicate that judges and practitioners consider Ohio land contract law to be well settled. However, the
range of holdings in the cases indicates that there are still very substantial unresolved issues. This section reviews those cases in an attempt to
determine the direction in which land contract law outside of the Act is
moving.
A.

Remedies

This section focuses on the primary remedies discussed in cases
decided under the Act, forfeiture and foreclosure. There is a guiding
premise-Ohio land contract law is unsettled enough that a court can
find support for almost any action it would like to take. These cases,
then, are interesting for at least three reasons: (1) they conflict with
each other; (2) each opinion includes ample support for the position
taken by the court; and, (3) the Ohio Supreme Court has not chosen to
accept any cases dealing with non-Act land contract remedy issues.

295. Id.
296. Section 2703.26 of the Ohio Revised Code is entitled "Lis pendens in general" and
states: "When summons has been served or publication made, the action is pending so as to charge
third persons with notice of its pendency. While pending, no interest can be acquired by third
persons in the subject of the action, as against the plaintiffs title." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2703.26 (Anderson 1981). Therefore, once the court in First Bank determined that Fudge had
been properly served, there was no question that Brooks took his land contract interest subject to
the pending foreclosure action by First Bank against Fudge.
297. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.02(A)(13).
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1. Forfeiture and Foreclosure as Remedies
In Johnson v. Maxwell,298 the Ninth District Court of Appeals
went to great lengths to review the vendor remedies of forfeiture and
foreclosure and to explain why it concluded that foreclosure is one of
the remedies for default on a land contract. The vendees in Johnson
defaulted on the land contract and the vendors sent them a notice purportedly pursuant to O.R.C. section 5313.06.299 The vendees made no
further payments to the vendors. Almost three months after the notice
was sent the vendors brought suit."' The trial court found that
$93,943.31 was due on the land contract, "cancelled" the land contract, placed the vendors in possession, but also ordered foreclosure,
i.e., that the property be sold with the proceeds from the sale being
applied to any unpaid real estate taxes and the debt owed to the
vendors.3 01
The controversy in Johnson arose when the sale brought a high bid
of only $52,000, which was made by the vendors.3 0 The trial court
nonetheless confirmed the sale, ordered distribution of the proceeds,
and granted the vendors a deficiency judgment of $46,324.17. ° The
vendees' first basis for appeal was that the Act controlled the case. The
court of appeals easily dealt with the vendees' contention by pointing
out that there was no proof of a dwelling on the property."0 4
The second basis for the appeal in Johnson was that, the trial court
erred in ordering foreclosure and granting a deficiency judgment when
the vendors had asserted their right to forfeiture. 05 The court of appeals also had little trouble in dealing with the vendees' desperate argument.3 06 The court first repeated the "qualification test"3 °7 from the
1923 Ohio Supreme Court decision in Norpac Realty Co. v.
Schackne,3 0 8 that forfeiture clauses are enforcable so long as the benefit to the vendor is not "extravagantly unreasonable or manifestly un-

298. Nos. 2354 and 2374 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Aug. 10, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
299. Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.06 (Anderson 1989)
300. Johnson, Nos. 2354 and 2374 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Aug. 10, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio
library, All Cases file).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.

304.
305.

Id.
Id.

306. "Desperate" may seem a little strong, but it strikes me as a last-ditch desperation
argument for vendees to assert that the trial court erred in not ordering forfeiture of their land
contract interest. Usually vendees seek equity, not rigid application of the common law.
307. Note, supra note 35, at 561; see also Durham, supra note 4, at 422-23.
308. 107 Ohio St. 425, 140 N.E. 480 (1923).
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just as to require equitable interference with the contract."3'0 9 The
court of appeals went on to state, however, that its interpretation of the
language from Norpac meant that "other remedies are favored and forfeiture clauses are rarely strictly enforced by modern Ohio courts."31
The Johnson court set forth what those "other" remedies might be
with a lengthy quote from the 1922 court of appeals decision in
Woloveck v. Schueler.3 1' The Woloveck court stated that, upon default
by the vendee, a vendor could sue for past payments or treat the land
contract as an equitable mortgage and request foreclosure. The court of
appeals in Johnson found that the trial court had correctly granted the
vendors' request for foreclosure and a deficiency despite the vendees'
desire to forfeit their interest in the land contract in order to avoid a
deficiency judgment. 12
To the Johnson court of appeals, then, forfeiture is still a remedy,
but not the preferred one. The court was willing to uphold a vendorrequested foreclosure and deficiency judgment although the vendees
wanted forfeiture. In favor of a future vendee, however, the Johnson
court indicated that a vendee's request for foreclosure should be entertained by a trial court if the facts favor foreclosure, even if the vendor
requests forfeiture.
2.

Forfeiture Granted

There are two cases in which Ohio courts of appeals have upheld
forfeiture, but in each the facts are such that the vendees had little
defense against forfeiture. The first is Kiser v. Coleman,1 13 which was
discussed previously as the case in which the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the Act did not apply to land contracts entered into before its
effective date.3 1 4 The trial court in Kiser had granted forfeiture. The
Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District reversed, holding that the
Act applied and that, because the land contract had been in effect for
more than five years, the vendee's remedy was foreclosure and not forfeiture. 5 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
thereby reinstating the trial court's order of forfeiture.3 1 6
While Kiser involved retroactive application of the Act, the facts
show how little equity the vendees had. The vendees, husband and wife,

309. Id. at 430, 140 N.E. at 481.
310. Johnson, Nos. 2354 and 2374 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist., Aug. 10, 1988) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, All Cases file).
311. Id.; see also Durham, supra note 4, at 422.
312. Id.
313. 28 Ohio St. 3d 259, 503 N.E.2d 753 (1986).
314. Id. at 262, 503 N.E.2d at 756; see also supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
315. Kiser, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 262, 503 N.E.2d at 756.
316. Id.
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had been chronically late in making monthly payments required by the
land contract up to the time of the husband's death.31 7 After his death,
the widow made a few "bulk" payments but was almost two years behind in payments when the vendors notified her of default. She then
made a bulk payment equal to almost 14 monthly payments with a
check which was dishonored. The vendors notified her that the contract
was forfeited and she should vacate. She responded by requesting that
her check should be presented for payment again."1
The vendee in Kiser later mailed to the vendors another check,
which she followed with a note that the check should be "held" before
being presented for payment.31 9 The only equity in the vendee's favor
was that she moved out only after the house burned down and the vendors, who apparently had reinsured after the notice of forfeiture, had
received an insurance payment roughly equal to the balance due on the
land contract. Nonetheless, the vendee had very little equity on her
side, and the facts of the case would justify forfeiture as well as any.
In Johannemann v. Georgeoff,20 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth District was confronted with an easier case. The vendees did not
execute the land contract and when the vendor brought suit for forfeiture of the vendees' interest, the vendees defended by naming a third
party defendant but never bothered to complete service.3 2 ' When the
vendor moved for summary judgment, the vendees responded but did
not file any affidavits. The trial court granted the vendor's motion for
summary judgment; the court of appeals affirmed.3 2 2 Factual issues
concerning forfeiture were alleged but no proof was ever offered, and
the court of appeals indicated that unless the responding party raised
specific facts the trial court was correct in granting the motion for sum23
mary judgment.
The foregoing cases offer little help to a vendor who desires forfeiture because they are odd cases, Kiser in its facts and procedure and
Johannemann because the decision is wholly procedural. If the vendee
has any equities on her side she should be able to distinguish the two
cases. On the other hand, the cases offer little help to a vendee who is
trying to avoid forfeiture because the cases do represent the willingness
of courts of appeals, and the Ohio Supreme Court, to allow final judg-

317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 260, 503 N.E.2d at 754.
Id.
Id.
No. 12852 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Apr. 1, 1987) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases

321.
322.
323.

Id.

file).
Id.
Id.
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ments for forfeiture.
3. Foreclosure Granted
Finally, there are two cases in which the courts of appeals have
upheld, and in one case expanded on, foreclosure. First, there is Johnson, which was discussed at the beginning of this section. 32 Although
in Johnson foreclosure was ordered over the protest of the vendees, the
court opined that forfeiture was not favored as a remedy and that foreclosure could be ordered at the request of either the vendor or the vendee.325 In that sense, Johnson is strong precedent for a vendee who is
trying to avoid forfeiture.
In Barton v. Antonucci, 2 ' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
District upheld a trial court order permitting a vendee to reinstate., 2 7
The vendor sought foreclosure, but the trial court gave the vendee the
opportunity to reinstate the land contract by paying the then-due payments, insurance, and taxes within sixty days of the judgment. 32 8 The
vendors' ability to bring a foreclosure action was not questioned, but
the court of appeals opined that missing one monthly payment, failing
to pay current insurance, and being behind on property taxes taken
together did not constitute a material breach. Therefore, the vendors
did not have an absolute right to foreclose.3 2 9 As with Johnson, Barton
indicates the willingness of a court of appeals to uphold equitable remedies ordered by the trial courts.
There do not appear to be any absolutes in land contract defaults,
and attorneys for both vendors and vendees must carefully evaluate the
facts of their cases in deciding what type of relief a trial court may
grant. The trend in land contract cases to which the Act does not apply
appears to be away from forfeiture and towards allowing reinstatement
or, if necessary, foreclosure. Nonetheless, the ultimate point must be
that a vendor or vendee can find case law support for almost any remedy in a case involving default on a non-Act land contract.
B.

Due on Sale and Other Non-Assignment Clauses

One of the hot topics in real estate finance law during the 1970's
and the early 1980's was the due on sale clause. 3 ' The issue was con324. See supra text accompanying notes 298-310.
325. Johnson, Nos. 2354 and 2374 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. Aug. 10, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio
library, All Cases file).
326. No. 83-C-49 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist. Mar. 18, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. NELSON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra note 6, at 323-29.
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fronted by the Ohio courts of appeals in land contract cases in two
different contexts: (1) whether the execution of the land contract by a
vendor would trigger a due on sale clause in the vendor's mortgage
with a third party lender; and (2) whether a land contract could require a vendee to obtain the vendor's approval before granting a mortgage on the vendee's interest.
1. Triggering of a Due on Sale Clause
There is no dispute that a due on sale clause is enforceable in
Ohio. The issue before the courts of appeals has been whether the language of a particular due on sale clause is enforceable against a vendor
who has entered into a land contract. The courts of appeals are split on
the issue, with two holding that the due on sale clause is not triggered
by the land contract and two others holding that the due on sale clause
is triggered by the land contract.
The Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District in Citizens Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Dayton v. Page,33 ' and the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh District in Peoples Savings and Loan Co. of
Ashtabula v. Shaffer,33 2 have both held that the due on sale clause is
not triggered by the vendor's execution of a land contract. In Citizens
Federal, the clause provided:
If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a)
the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Mortgage,
Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all sums secured by this Mortgage to be immediately due and payable. 3 '
In Peoples Savings & Loan, the clause provided:
Grantor does hereby agree not to suffer any lien superior to the lien
hereby created, . . . and further agrees not to sell or dispose of said
premises or any part thereof nor any building or improvement thereon
without first obtaining the written consent of the grantee, nor shall any
other waste be committed or suffered by the grantor.3 3 4
Although the court in Citizens Federal based its decision on prior
Ohio cases a3 ' and the court in Peoples Savings & Loan based its deci-

331. No. 83-03-018 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Jan. 9, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
332. No. 1200 (Ohio Ct. App., I lth Dist. May 17, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
333. Citizens Federal, No. 83-03-018 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Jan. 9, 1984) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, All Cases file).
334. Shaffer, No. 1200 (Ohio Ct. App., I1th Dist. May 17, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
335. Wayne Bldg. and Loan Co. v. Yarborough, I I Ohio St. 2d 195 (1967); Butcher v.
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sion on O.R.C. section 5313.01(A), 3 6 which states that the vendor retains title, 3 7 the bottom line is the same. For each court the creation of
an interest in the vendee left the vendor with legal title and created in
the vendee no rights superior to those of the mortgagee. Therefore,
both courts reasoned that the clauses were not triggered. The court of
appeals in Citizens Federal went so far as to state that, even though
possession would be given to the vendee, the due on sale clause was
ambiguous because it did not mention land contracts. The clause,
therefore, had to be construed against the lender who supplied the
mortgage.3 38
The two cases holding that the vendor's execution of a land contract does trigger a due on sale clause are both published opinions. In
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Toledo v. Perry's Landing,"3 9 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth District was confronted with
a due on sale clause which was triggered by a change in ownership. 4
The court of appeals held that the execution of the land contract did
trigger the due on sale clause, but reversed and remanded the case to
the trial court to make factual determinations on the vendor/mortgagor's claim that the lender was estopped from asserting the due on sale
clause under the facts present in the case.3 4 '
In Blue Ash Building & Loan Co. v. Hahn,a42 the Court of Appeals for the First District was faced with a due on sale clause which
began "[a]nd further that if there shall be any change in the ownership
of the premises herein described without the consent of said mortgagee."' 343 The court held that the language "any change in the ownership
of the premises" encompassed the execution of a land contract because
the vendee at least obtained equitable title to the property.34 4
These cases present a difficult problem for attorneys representing
both lenders and borrowers/vendors. The court in each case emphasized the language of the particular due on sale clause before it. The
courts in both First Federal and Blue Ash Building & Loan were given
the most simple language to apply, that of a "change" of ownership,
which the execution of a land contract undoubtedly causes. Further,

Kagy Lumber Co., 164 Ohio St. 85 (1955).
336. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.01 (Anderson 1986).
337. Id. § 5313.01(A) (Anderson 1986).
338. Citizens Federal, No. 83-03-018 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Jan. 9, 1984) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, All Cases file).
339. II Ohio App. 3d 135, 463 N.E.2d 636 (1983).
340. Id. at 136, 463 N.E.2d at 639.
341. Id. at 147, 463 N.E.2d at 650.
342. 20 Ohio App. 3d 21, 22, 484 N.E.2d 186, 189 (1984).
343. Id. at 22, 484 N.E.2d at 187.
344. Id. at 23-24, 484 N.E.2d at 188-89.
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the language applied by the courts in Citizens Federal and Peoples
Savings & Loan is not as clear, but at the same time the execution of a
land contract does appear in Citizens Federal to "transfer" "an interest
therein" and in Peoples Savings & Loan to "sell or dispose of said
premises or any part thereof."
The courts in Citizens Federal and Peoples Savings & Loan
strictly applied the mortgages against the lenders, who likely were responsible for either the drafting of the mortgages or for the selection of
the form of the mortgages from some standard forms. Whether the
courts are correct in their interpretations of the language in the due on
sale clauses, it puts a great strain on attorneys to predict just how
strong their clients' positions are. While not addressing the question
directly, however, the Ohio Supreme Court may have given some guidance in a recent case on a related question.
2.

Vendor's Approval of Vendee's Mortgage

A related but different problem from application of a due on sale
clause was confronted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Security Bank v.
Hawk.345 Security Bank involved the validity of a mortgage granted by
the vendees on their land contract interest. The land contract stated
that "[i]t is further understood and agreed that the said buyers shall
not sell, assign, or transfer this contract, or any interest therein, or in
said premises, without the written consent of the sellers being first obtained and endorsed thereon." 3 46 The vendees granted a mortgage without seeking or obtaining the vendors' approval.3 47 The vendees later assigned their interest in the contract to Hawk, but they sought and
received approval from the surviving vendor. Finally, Hawk failed to
pay the mortgage debt, but remained current on the land contract. 48
One of the issues before the court was whether the vendees' granting of
the mortgage without obtaining the vendors' consent was a breach of
the non-assignment clause.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Wright held that execution
of the mortgage without obtaining the vendors' approval violated the
non-assignment clause.3 49 After repeating the clause, Justice Wright
made this simple disposition of the issue: "The facts indicate the sellers
did not give consent, written or verbal, to the mortgage. By negotiating
a mortgage without the consent of the sellers when the land contract

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

35 Ohio St. 3d 1, 517 N.E.2d 886 (1988).
Id. at 3, 517 N.E.2d at 888.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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specifically required such, the buyer breached the land contract. 35 0 It
appears, therefore, that the Ohio Supreme Court was uninterested in
drawing fine lines as to what constitutes a transfer of an interest in real
property.
The holding in Security Bank does shed some light on what the
Ohio Supreme Court might hold in a case where a mortgagee claims
that the execution of a land contract by the mortgagor triggered a due
on sale clause. Consider the due on sale clause language from Citizens
FederalSavings and Loan Association of Dayton v. Page, which began
by stating: "If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is
sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent,
excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this
Mortgage. 3 51 Further, in Peoples Savings & Loan, the due on sale
clause provided that "Grantor does hereby agree not to suffer any lien
superior to the lien hereby created ....
and further agrees not to sell or
dispose of said premises or any part thereof nor any building or improvement thereon .... ,,'51 This language is as clear as the language
interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Security Bank ("shall not
sell, assign, or transfer this contract, or any interest therein"). The
Ohio Supreme Court did not choose to scrutinize whether "any interest
therein" meant a mortgage; on the other hand the court accepted the
clause at face value, thus acknowledging that granting a mortgage certainly is the transfer of an interest. Arguably, the Ohio Supreme Court
would treat other cases the same and broadly read any prohibition on
transfer to cover any transfer, including a transfer by execution of a
land contract.
C.

ProceduralIssues

Finally, the courts of appeals have dealt with four primarily procedural issues concerning land contracts. These cases are instructive as a
group in establishing how the courts of appeals view the respective interests of vendors and vendees in land contracts not subject to the Act.
1. Vendee As a Party in Foreclosure Against Vendor
In Botnick Building Co. v. Eldred,153 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth District was faced with the issue of the interests of a vendee
350.
351.
All Cases
352.
All Cases
353.

Id.
Page, No. 83-02-018 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th Dist. Jan. 9, 1984) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
file).
Shaffer, No. 1200 (Ohio Ct. App., 1 th Dist. May 17, 1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
file).
No. 13522 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. July 27, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
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when the vendor's mortgagee brings a foreclosure action." 4 Botnick
sold property to the Cains, taking back a second mortgage, and the
Cains as vendors executed a land contract with the Eldreds as vendees. a5 5 The Eldreds assumed payment of the mortgage from the Cains
to Botnick, and when the Eldreds defaulted Botnick brought a foreclosure action naming the Cains and the Eldreds. 3 " The Eldreds filed a
counterclaim alleging that Botnick "maliciously interfered with their
land contract with the Cains. ' 57 The trial court granted Botnick's motion for/summary judgment both on the foreclosure issue and the
58
counterclaim.
In a brief opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to Botnick. a59 First, it is clear from the
fact that the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the
Eldreds were proper parties to Botnick's foreclosure action. This is no
surprise because as vendees they had an interest in the property and
Botnick, as a foreclosing mortgagee, certainly wanted any interest the
Eldreds had to be extinguished as part of the foreclosure action.
Second, although the Eldreds claimed that there were facts requiring a trial on Botnick's foreclosure action, the court of appeals stated
simply that there were no facts alleged by the Eldreds "to preclude
foreclosure of Cains' interest."36 0 The Eldreds might have alleged such.
facts, but did not. Further, the court of appeals considered it Cains'
interest which was being foreclosed. Not surprisingly, the vendees,
therefore, were proper parties, but they were defending based on the
actions of their vendors. Either the debt was paid or not; since it had
not been paid, the vendees lost.
2.

Interest of Vendor's Judgment Creditor

In Myers v. Parsley,36 1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District was presented with the issue of what priority, if any, a judgment
creditor of the vendor has against the interest of the vendee. In March,
1983, the Runyons sold property to Parsley by a land contract. In Au-

354. Id. For discussion of a case in which the court, applying the Act, stated that vendee of
a prior recorded land contract is entitled to notice of a foreclosure, see supra text accompanying
notes 290-97.
355. Eldred, No. 13522 (Ohio Ct. App., 9th Dist. July 27, 1988) (LEXIS, Ohio library. All
Cases file).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. No. 85CA9 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Mar. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
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gust, 1983, Myers obtained a judgment against the Runyons and filed a
certificate of judgment giving him a lien against all real property
owned by the Runyons. 6 2 In April, 1984, Parsley made a balloon payment of the balance due on the land contract. 6 3 Finally, in January,
1985, Myers filed a foreclosure action against Parsley. The trial court
dismissed the complaint after hearing cross motions for summary
judgment.3 64
The Myers court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the foreclosure action.36 5 While the court cited two older cases for the proposition
that the vendor retains an interest, "more than naked title,"3 6 it also
referred to O.R.C. section 5313.02(B) for the proposition that the vendor could enter into a mortgage for up to the amount due the vendor
from the vendee.36 7 The Myers court then stated its formulation of the
law which formed the basis for its decision:
The land contract vendor's interest consists of two parts, a right to payment of a sum of money and an interest in the land which declines in
value with each payment .... Although a judgment creditor may intercept the payments by attachment or garnishment, only this declining interest in the land is subject to foreclosure on a judgment lien as "lands
and tenements" under R.C. 2329.02.368
The Myers court of appeals then reached one of two possible results--once it is clear that the vendor's creditor has no more interest
than does the vendor, then the issue becomes whether the vendee receives credit for payments made after the judgment lien arose or if the
vendee only receives credit for payments made before the judgment lien
arose. The court of appeals held that the vendee should receive credit
for all payments made before the vendee has actual notice of the judgment lien. The court balanced the interests of the vendee and the judgment creditor, and the burdens which would result from either holding,
and found that it is unreasonable to make the vendee determine if any
new liens had been recorded before making each payment. However,
the court held it is reasonable to make the judgment creditor give notice to the vendee of the judgment lien.
The holding in Myers greatly enhances the value of the vendee's
interest because the vendee is permitted to complete the contract and

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
All Cases
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Id.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5313.02(B) (Anderson 1989).

Myers, No. 85CA9 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Mar. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
file).
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receive good title unless the vendee has actual notice that there is a
new lien against the vendor's title. Although one could quibble about
allowing the vendee to make the last payment, particularly a balloon
payment, without checking to determine if the vendor has good title to
convey,"8 9 the vendee should not be required to conduct a title search
before making every payment. Further, the holding in Myers mandates that judgment creditors identify specific parcels to which the
judgment lien has attached, rather than taking a wait and see approach
with the debtor and any property in which the debtor might have an
interest. As the court of appeals in Myers stated:
[The vendee] cannot be held to have constructive notice of the filing of
the certificate of lien. Equity should protect his good faith investments.
The judgment creditor, on the other hand, only has to check once to
discover the contract and identify the purchaser. He should therefore
bear the burden of notice. 70
3.

Interest of Vendee's Mechanic's Lien Claimant

In Clifton v. Malone, 7 ' which involved a vendee's mechanic's lien
claimant, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District also considered
the vendee's interest in the property as a strong one. Clifton was a contractor who built a swimming pool for Malone and her co-vendee on
property they were purchasing on a land contract from the Blankenships. Malone and her co-vendee did not pay either that due the
Blankenships on the land contract or that due Clifton on the contract
for construction of the swimming pool. 372
Clifton's suit asserted his mechanic's lien against Malone's vendee's interest in the land contract and asserted that the mechanic's lien
should have first priority. Clifton's theory was that if the Blankenships

369. The parallel in mortgage law is to require the borrower to determine if the lender, or
the lender's assignee to whom the borrower has been paying, has the promissory note. If under the
Uniform Commercial Code the note is negotiable and the holder of the note is a holder in due
course, in order to protect himself the borrower must determine if the holder is in possession of
note before making any payment because payment is a personal defense which cannot be asserted
against a holder in due course. NELSON, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, supra note 6, § 5.33, at 593-94.
In addition, Professors Nelson and Whitman go on to state that even though payment to a nonholder of a note can be raised by the borrower as a defense against the holder of the note who is
not a holder in due course under the Uniform Commercial Code, "[Tihere is some authority that,
if a final payment is being made, it is so customary and natural for the debtor to demand surrender of the physical note that his failure to do so is negligence, and hence that his payment will
give him no defense against the assignee. Id. at 394.
370. Myers, No. 85CA9 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Mar. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
371. No. 429 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Nov. 22, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All Cases
file).
372. Id.
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obtained either forfeiture or foreclosure they would be unjustly enriched by the increase in value to the property caused by Clifton's construction of the swimming pool. 373 The Blankenships then sued for foreclosure, which the court allowed even though under the Act they could
have sought forfeiture.174 The Blankenships insisted that, as vendors,
they had priority over Clifton on the proceeds of a foreclosure sale.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals agreed with the
Blankenships. The court of appeals analogized the situation to one in
which a mechanic's lien claimant contracts with a tenant to make improvements on a leasehold. The court of appeals cited Romito Brothers
Electric Construction Co. v. Frank Flannery, Inc., 73 an Ohio Supreme
Court opinion, for the proposition that the mechanic's lien attaches
only to the tenant's interest and not to the landlord's. Such an argument may seem to devalue the vendee's interest in the real estate by
comparing it to that of a tenant. However, the Clifton court of appeals
did hold that the vendee's interest still was assertable in the vendor's
forfeiture and foreclosure actions.
While the court of appeals opined that the Blankenships should
not be permitted to profit from any increase in value caused by the
swimming pool, it did state that affording the Blankenships first priorty
was not tantamount to unjust enrichment. The result is that the Clifton
court treated the vendee's interest in the underlying land contract as if
it were a second mortgage and Clifton's lien as if it were being asserted
in a foreclosure of a first mortgage but with priority over the second
mortgage.
The court of appeals in Clifton also considered, in dictum, the result if the Blankenships had sued for forfeiture, rather than foreclosure. 76 The court stated that Ohio recognizes a cause of action "for
unjust enrichment under the facts set forth in [Clifton's] complaint. '377
The court further stated that such an action could be based either on
quasi-contract or on unjust enrichment. The Clifton decision, therefore,
affirms the strength of the vendee's interest because the vendee may
create a further interest which survives foreclosure and, in a limited
form, forfeiture of the vendee's interest.

373. Id.
374. Id. The land contract had not been in effect for five years or more nor had the vendees
paid more than 20% of the purchase price. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
375. Clifton, No. 429 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Nov. 22, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
376. Id.
377. Malone, No. 85CA9 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist. Mar. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
All Cases file).
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Vendee's Suit for Damages After Forfeiture

In Hervey v. Holmes,378 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District encountered a land contract clause which ultimately provided
great benefit to the vendee. The land contract included a default clause
which, after providing for forfeiture, stated: "Payments theretofore
made by buyer pursuant to this contract shall be credited by Seller to
the reasonable rental value of said property, and any excess of said
payments over such reasonable rental value shall be refunded to
buyer. '3 79 The land contract also extended to the vendor the right to
declare the land contract to be accelerated and that the vendor then
"may by appropriate action, law or equity proceed to enforce payment
thereof."38 0
The vendee in Hervey abandoned the land after default; the vendor contended that the forfeiture language, which preceded the quoted
clause controlled, but the court of appeals held that the entire forfeiture clause must be read together. a8 1 Therefore, the court reasoned, because it found that the trial court's determination of "reasonable rental
value" was supported by the evidence, the vendee was entitled to a
judgment of $8,605.93, the difference between the amount paid by the
vendee and the reasonable rental value of the property." 2
The J.ervey case is interesting because it recognizes a contractual
provision in favor of the vendee which survives forfeiture even after a
voluntary abandonment by the vendee. The vendor in Hervey undoubtedly felt shortchanged, as was evidenced by the fact that the vendor
sued for damages on the theory that the vendee's payments were less
than the reasonable rental value. The case, then, is another example of
how the Ohio courts are utilizing their equitable powers to reach beyond the rigidity of common law forfeiture.
V.

CONCLUSION

Many Ohio land contract law cases were decided during the
1980's. Most of the decisions were not published, with the result that
the cases are of limited value as precedent. Nonetheless, a pattern has
emerged in the courts of appeals' collective treatment of land contract
cases. Several points can be made which, taken together, can form a
broad basis for determining the current status of land contract law in

378. No. 88AP070052 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist. Feb. 7, 1989) (LEXIS, Ohio library, All
Cases file).
379. Id. (emphasis added).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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Ohio.
First, the Ohio courts of appeals are liberally using the Act and
liberally interpretating the Act. Courts of appeals have applied the Act
to cases in which it is difficult to determine if the Act should apply, and
in a few cases in which it appears that the Act does not apply. As to
interpretation of the Act, the courts of appeals have been quite liberal
in that they have rejected hyper-technical arguments and are using certain sections of the Act to decide cases even when a court clearly is not
applying the Act as a whole.
On the other hand, the courts of appeals have been permitting forfeiture for vendors who follow the procedures set forth in the Act. Although there are cases in which some courts of appeals have appeared
to deny forfeiture on behalf of vendees who can raise equitable arguments, the majority of cases where forfeiture has been granted by the
trial courts were upheld by the courts of appeals. Arguably, the courts
of appeals are satisfied with applying the Act rather than questioning
the impact it has on individual vendees.
That does not mean that vendees always lose. Because forfeiture is
a drastic remedy, it can appear that the courts of appeals have become
pro-vendor. On the contrary, the courts of appeals are most interested
in strictly applying the Act's terms, whether to the benefit of the vendor or the vendee. Again, because forfeiture is a drastic remedy, the
forfeiture cases stand out and arguably are the cases most likely to be
appealed because the stakes are greatest for both parties. Vendees, especially those to whom the Act applies and have paid for more than
five years or have paid more than 20% of the purchase price, do win
cases and do receive fair consideration by the courts of appeals.
As to land contract cases to which the Act does not apply, the
courts of appeals appear to be even more liberal. Non-Act land contract law arguably has become pro-vendee, both because there are few
reported cases in which forfeiture is even requested, much less granted,
and because in the other land contract cases the courts of appeals appear to balance equities between the vendor and the vendee, rather
than strictly apply the terms of land contracts or the common law.
While no meaningful summary statement can be made about the courts
of appeals in land contract cases outside the Act, it appears that vendees are receiving fair treatment.
It is more difficult to generalize about the state of land contract
law before the Ohio Supreme Court. The court has accepted few land
contract cases and seems content to let the courts of appeals fashion
Ohio land contract law. When the Ohio Supreme Court has stepped in,
however, it has literally applied the Act, much like the courts of appeals. It will be interesting to see how some of the current disputes
Published by eCommons, 1988
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about land contract law among the courts of appeals will be resolved in
the future by the Ohio Supreme Court.
No definitive statement about the state of Ohio land contract law
can be made. Land contract law is fluid, especially because most of the
cases are not published, and therefore of little precedential value. The
practitioner can only evaluate the most recent cases, published and unpublished, and hope for the best. The most that can be said is the
courts are literally using the Act as the guidepost of Ohio land contract
law and that if one's client has a clear right under the Act it is likely
that the client will prevail on that particular issue.
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